


JPRS-EER-91-076

6 JUNE 1991



---

# ***JPRS Report***

## **East Europe**

---

# East Europe

JPRS-EER-91-076

## CONTENTS

6 June 1991

### POLITICAL

#### ALBANIA

Draft Program of Albanian Workers Party [ZERI I POPULLIT 5 May]	1
Demands of Union of Independent Trade Unions [SINDIKALISTI 18 Apr]	7

#### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Dienstbier Meets With PLO's Abu Mazin [Bratislava Radio]	8
Slovakia's Knazko Seeks 'International' Treaty [CTK]	8
CPCZ Chief Interviewed by Bulgarian Paper [Sofia DUMA 20 May]	9
Revival Club Terminates Activities [Prague Radio]	9

#### POLAND

Walesa, Bielecki, Balcerowicz Hold Talks [RZECZPOSPOLITA 15 May]	9
Ministry on Repatriation of Poles From USSR [GAZETA WYBORCZA 20 May]	10
Monthly on Strategies of Political Figures: April [KONFRONTACJE Apr]	11
Monthly on Strategies of Political Camps: April [KONFRONTACJE Apr]	12
KONFRONTACJE Political Tidbits: April [KONFRONTACJE Apr]	13
Opinion Poll on Trade Unions, Political Parties [PAP]	14
POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup: 21-27 Apr [POLITYKA 27 Apr]	14

#### ROMANIA

Birladeanu on Prominent Front Leaders, Reform [ADEVARUL 16 Apr]	16
Reintegration Into West Not 'Simple and Easy' [ROMANIA LIBERA 18 Apr]	19
FSN's Ion Stoica Fears Neocommunism [ADEVARUL 16 Apr]	20
Editorial on the Mid-April Eger Conference [ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO 14 May]	22
Political Prospects of Ecology Parties Assessed [ROMANIA LIBERA 24 Apr]	24
Ethnic Conflict Said To Obscure 'Real Problems' [ROMANIA LIBERA 18 Apr]	25
Culture Ministry on Minorities, Jewish Community [DREPTATEA 6 Apr]	26
Nastase on Relations With 'Neighbors' [LUMEA AZI 16 May]	28

#### YUGOSLAVIA

Mesic Seen as SFRY Constitutional President [VJESNIK 17 May]	32
Croatian Rejection of New Defense Law Explained [VJESNIK 17 May]	33
Role, Importance of Croatian Special Forces [DANAS 9 Apr]	34
Goals of Muslim National Council of Sandzak [BORBA 20 May]	36
Zagreb Professor on Defense System Changes [VREME 20 May]	38

### MILITARY

#### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Army Officers To Train in U.S., France [CTK]	40
--	----

### ECONOMIC

#### POLAND

China Expected To Set Up 30 Joint Ventures [PAP]	41
--	----

Reprivatization Efforts, Draft Laws Reviewed	[SPOTKANIE 27 Mar]	41
Delay in Granting Subsidies to Farmers Noted	[RZECZPOSPOLITA 22 Apr]	41
Economic Consultative Meeting 'Fruitful'	[Warsaw Radio]	42

## ROMANIA

Stolojan on Restoring Supply-Demand Balance	[TINERETUL LIBER 25 Apr]	42
---	--------------------------	----

## ALBANIA

### Draft Program of Albanian Workers Party

91P20343A Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian  
5 May 91 pp 2-3

["Text" of draft program of the Albanian Workers Party]

[Text]

#### Introduction

Albania has entered into a new stage of political, economic, and social development which makes it essential to draw up a new party program, which is also dictated by the changes which have taken place in Europe.

The Albanian Workers Party [PPSH] entered into political life at a time when Albania was occupied by foreigners and assumed responsibility for the fate of the people at a time when their very existence as a nation was threatened. Inheriting and enriching the best traditions of our history, the party organized and led the Antifascist National Liberation War which secured the true national independence and freedom of the country, founded the new Albanian state, and affirmed Albania in the bosom of the great family of peoples and opened a new road to development.

The Workers Party equipped the people with a program which enabled Albania to overcome the profound backwardness inherited from the past, to bring about great socioeconomic changes, and embark on the road to industrialization, development, and economic-cultural progress.

In their entire activity, the members of the PPSH have been inspired by the noble ideals of a free and democratic society, in order to overthrow social injustice and establish justice and equality among people, in order to eliminate the monopoly of knowledge and provide education to all the people, for the increasing of the well being of the people and for general progress.

Along with its achievements, in its many years of activity the Party has also had mistakes and failures, with negative political, and, especially, economic and social results. They are the result of deficiencies in the model of the economic, political, and social system which we adopted, in the depletion of its potential for further development, in a lack of knowledge, and in the mechanical copying of foreign experiences, in subjectivism in the adoption of important decisions, in the solution of a number of problems on the basis of rigid theoretical patterns.

The Party is determined to break away, in a decisive manner, from all the errors of the past, from the limitation of democracy in economic and social life and in Party life, from party-government duplication, from the command administrative methods which have nurtured and encouraged the bureaucracy with power, privileges,

and the elevation to positions of responsibility of incompetent individuals who do not have the confidence of the masses, which has caused them to be alienated from the people and which has damaged the prestige of the Party, as well as from violations of human rights and sectarian attitudes in the name of the class struggle. The Party is determined to break away from dogmatism and subjectivism, which result in provoked and erroneous actions such as the absolutizing of state ownership and its extension everywhere, the limitation on the land in the cooperativist yard and the herding of livestock, the prohibition by law of religious beliefs, the overemphasis on moral stimuli and the levelling of wages, which diminished the workers' interest in their work, etc., and the absolutizing of the principle of reliance on our own forces which resulted, in particular, in the economic and cultural isolation of the country, etc.

The new Party program aims to set forth the basic objectives for which the Workers Party must work in the future, keeping in mind the positive and negative appearance of the past, current democratic processes, and the prospects for future development.

#### I. The Renewal of the Party

The PPSH, in accordance with the stages of development of the country and domestic and foreign conditions, had constructed its activity and its organizational structure, so that it is being renewed in its composition with the best sons and daughters of the people.

Under the new conditions created, the Workers Party has begun a profound qualitative renewal. It believes that this is essential from the viewpoint of its capability as a political force, in order to fulfill, today and in the future, its duty to the people: the progress and democratization of Albanian society, the achievement of socialist ideals, the improvement of the material and intellectual well being of the people.

The dimensions of this renewal are dictated by some notable factors.

The one-party system exhausted potentials and began to hinder development. The Party prepared the terrain itself and agreed that, by the will of the people, the construction of a pluralistic democracy and a law-governed state would begin, which would guarantee human rights and the equality of each subject before the law. Now and later our Party will have to fulfill its commitments under conditions of cooperation and also political confrontation with other forces and parties, whether in opposition or as allies.

The system of a centralized economy, legitimized in the phase of extensive development, was bureaucratized over the years and became a hindrance to the development of production forces. The Workers Party understood the future and made way for decentralization and gradual transition to a market economy. In addition to material development, the pluralism of ownership which we are building will also bring social problems. Our



Party must be capable, in the framework of the law-governed state, to stimulate the increasing and modernization of production and of the protection of the social rights of workers.

Albania is entering into the flow of the European integration processes. Economic and political cooperation with the world is increasing. In this regard our Party must be an active political force in Albanian society so that our country will profit to the maximum from this cooperation, while, at the same time, preserving its independence, freedom, and national identity.

The renewal of the PPSH is dictated by other reasons, such as: the need to overcome the crisis affecting the country, to resolutely eliminate bureaucracy and corruption at all levels of the state and party apparatus, to restore faith in our Workers Party as quickly as possible, since this faith has been shaken in some of the people and some of the members of the Party.

All possibilities exist for the renewal process begun by the Party to be accelerated. This is desired and welcomed by Party members and supporters. The vote of confidence which the majority of the people gave it in the first pluralistic elections proves that the people have high regard for the achievements of the past and believe that the Party has learned from its mistakes. Many of those who criticized the Party expressed their call for its renewal by not voting for its candidates.

Party members and supporters, from different generations and classes, honest and patriotic, are devoted and able, so that by the force of their thought and activity the renewal of the Workers Party will be achieved, in the service of the best future of the people and of our homeland.

## II. In the Political and Ideological Field

The new economic, social, and political developments and their future prospects within the country and in the international arena require the renewal of the ideological bases and the political objectives of the Party.

1. The Party bases its orientation towards the national, democratic, and socialist ideal on the most important ideological and cultural achievements of our country and of humanity, in accordance with the country's needs for social progress.

—On the democratic, progressive, patriotic traditions of our people over the centuries, on their highest aspirations for equality and social justice expressed in the National Renaissance and the National-Liberation War.

—On the best experience of the struggle and of the work of the party members and of our people in these decades of the new society, generalized and formulated in those ideas and viewpoints which serve the realization of the objectives which, at the present time, the Party has set for its political activity.

—On the progressive theoretical culture which mankind has inherited and which expresses his aspirations for social equality and justice, on the ideas of Marx, viewed in a critical manner, and in accordance with today's conditions.

—On the best achievements of the theoretical and political thought of our times, the progressive currents and trends, which are the basis for the peoples' aspirations for democracy and the best possible life.

2. Albanian society has embarked upon the road to the creation of a pluralistic democratic state and a market economy, aiming at integration into positive present-day European processes. The Party maintains that today this is the alternative which permits the development and wise utilization of the creative potentials which we have as a people and a country. Under the conditions of a society with a pluralistic democracy and a market economy, the Party will work to promote and defend socialist ideals.

In the name of these ideals, the Party will aim to achieve social justice and equality and to expand the sphere of activity of human values created by mankind, to ensure that the legal rights proclaimed by the constitution are achieved while developing the freedom and personality of the individual and to ensure that our society will be free of sharp social distinctions, exploitation and destabilizing factors and that the activity of the laws of the market economy will not be expressed by social, family, or individual traumas.

The theoretical and political opinion of the Workers Party is a reality. Life shows that the market economy is an essential choice in the stage of development at which our society has arrived but it is also exposed to some negative consequences which confront today's civilized world. We are not offering a social utopia but a policy to ensure that these phenomena will create a minimum of disturbing problems and that the workers, peasants, and intellectuals, the women and the youth, who, naturally, are and will be the most important social supporters of the Workers Party, will be protected from these problems in the most effective manner. The Party also promotes the protection of the interests of artisans, owners of small and medium-size properties, as workers and active participants in the economic development of the country.

3. The Party is determined to carry out its total reorganization, in all organizational structures and at all levels and to further perfect its work style and method. The Party will give special attention to its further democratization, to the purging of degenerate, compromised, and careerist elements which have caused abuse by being in the Party and acting in the Party's name. It will work for a general renewal of the composition of the leading forums from the center to the grassroots, for making the composition of the Party more sound, by changing the criteria for admitting new members.

4. Resolutely in favor of the impenetrable nature of the democratic processes and their uninterrupted extension, the Albanian Workers Party will work for the further improvement of the political system and for the effective realization of the role assigned to the organs elected by the people. The Party will consistently combat any manifestation of totalitarianism from any political force whatsoever.

In reforming the political system, the Workers Party adheres to the principles of democracy, among which the most basic are: the principle of free, secret, and pluralistic elections, the principle of the responsibility of the executive power to the People's Assembly and the voters, the principle of separation of the political parties from the state, of the responsibility and submission of the military authorities and those protecting the system to the organs of the government, the formulation and approval of the laws by open public procedures, the guaranteeing of human rights and basic freedoms on the basis of the laws and in accordance with the obligations stipulated by international law, the principle of the independence of judicial organs, etc.

5. One of the main aims of the program of democratic transformations which the Party undertook is the eradication of the bureaucracy. The democratization of the life of the country and the profound reforms in the economy create the suitable conditions for a successful head-on attack against the bureaucracy. The Party will work with determination to lighten the state apparatus and to develop its dynamic and effective character. It will also work for the determination and fully legal regulation of the status of the official [nepunes], with its rights and responsibilities.

6. The Albanian Workers Party will have as its main aim the strengthening of the law-governed state so that the law will be for all. There is no recommendation, decision, order, or authority of any party or political force which is above the law. Political parties and social organizations are separate from the state and they operate in an independent manner. In such a democratic political system, the law-governed state guarantees to all parties and political forces equal opportunity for achieving their aims and objectives by democratic means and procedures.

In order for the law-governed state to function normally, state activity must be carried on only by authorized state organs and always in accordance with the Constitution and the legislation in force. The Party will struggle consistently for the continuing improvement of legislation, so that the relations of individuals, collectives, organizations, and institutions with the state will be regulated by publicly recognized unitary legal norms.

7. The Workers Party will work to ensure that the defense and the security of the country are strengthened and guaranteed. It will support the further democratization of life in the armed forces, the modernization and improvement of the organization and training of the

military, the improvement of the living conditions of the soldiers, of the working conditions and the economic treatment of cadres and their families, and the reduction of the period of military service.

The Albanian Workers Party supports the process of removing the party character of the army, the internal affairs organs, the office of the attorney general, and the investigative and judicial organs.

8. The PPSH is in favor of a loyal dialog and correct and democratic relations with every party and political force which has emerged or which will emerge in the country, if these organizations, in their goals and actions, are guided by the interests of the homeland and its freedom and independence.

9. The Albanian Workers Party, on the basis of cooperation with social organizations, will work consistently for the protection and the uninterrupted strengthening of the unity of the people. It believes that, in the new conditions of a pluralistic society, unity will be achieved in a new manner. There will be unity in economic, political, ideological, and cultural diversity, on the basis of high-priority national and all-society interests.

10. The Albanian Workers Party, on the basis of the achievement of basic socio-political and economic rights and freedoms, is in favor of the creation of a legal system which would ensure the achievement of human rights according to international norms stated in such important documents as the UN General Declaration of Human Rights and Civil Rights, and in documents from the CSCE conferences in Helsinki, Paris, and Copenhagen. The Party will work to ensure that the following are respected: freedom of conscience and belief, the right to assembly and to peaceful demonstration, unity in organizations, associations, and political parties, the right of every person to travel freely within and outside the country. It will work to guarantee the rights of minorities provided by the Constitution and other laws and according to international juridical norms.

The Albanian Workers Party will work to ensure human rights and freedoms in accordance with contemporary norms, while protecting our intellectual, national, and popular values, our good traditions and customs, and different features of various ethnic and social groups, always in the interest of the development of a culture on national, popular, and democratic bases.

11. As always, the Workers Party will give special attention to the nationality problem. It considers as part of this problem the matter of Kosovo and of Albanians in Yugoslavia, the support, without reservation, of their legitimate and indisputable demands for national rights and freedoms in the form which they regard as acceptable and timely.

Our Party will be concerned about and will protect the interests of the Cam population, which is an inseparable part of our nationality problem. The PPSH will support and assist the Albanian diaspora everywhere in the world

in protecting and cultivating their language, culture, and their national traditions and customs, and it will expand contacts and cooperation with this population.

### III. In the Economic Field

The economic program of the Party aims at the achievement, under new conditions, of the basic goal to which it has dedicated itself: concern for the individual and for his well-being.

The Party aims at the deep reform of production relations, the economical and effective utilization of all natural resources and human potentials for the development of the country; the creation of a modern economy, with broad possibilities for reproduction, consumption, and renewal in accordance with the comprehensive interests of the people.

1. The Workers Party is committed to carrying out a total reform of the economy, for the transition to the market economy system in which all forms of ownership coexist and compete, coordinating the demands of a modern market with the regulatory role of the state.

The Party will strive for an economic system which gives everyone an opportunity to pursue their individual and collective economic interests, to live by their own sweat and contributions, while protecting them from alienation in property and work relations and in their results. Its aim is to develop a complex and effective economy, which is open and capable of cooperating and competing with other countries.

The Party wants all forms of economic activities which are useful for society, as well as all forms of work and ownership, to have equal legal status and to compete freely.

2. The economic strategy of the Workers Party consists of a deep restructuring of the economic system. This restructuring will aim at ensuring the full freedom and independence of the economic subjects, turning the workers into joint owners with shares and joint participants in the earnings of state enterprises, removing the state monopoly on prices, wages, hard currency, and foreign trade.

The Party believes that the fiscal system will stimulate investments and guarantee their effective utilization which will limit social polarizations and will protect population strata with the lowest incomes, by means of a fair redistribution policy.

The Party supports the opinion that the land should remain state property. It will aim for the rapid modernization of agriculture and the implementation of progressive economic-production systems. The Party will work for economic independence, the rethinking and reorganizing of agricultural cooperatives according to progressive models and for their complex development on the basis of the opportunities offered by the entire territorial space in which they carry out their activity. It will

support all those measures which aim at the mechanization of work in the village, in order to increase labor productivity and release agricultural workers from heavy physical activity.

The Party will support the free will and initiatives of the peasantry to develop production in yards and other economic forms which respond to its needs and interests and the conditions of every zone of the country.

3. With the creation of a new economic climate and the training of the necessary legal personnel, the Party will work to intensify cooperation with foreign capital and participation in the international division of labor. It supports the view that advantages of climate, geographic position, natural resources, and labor can be broadly utilized for the priority development of infrastructures, the consumer industry, the tourist industry, and vital services.

The Party will aim to ensure that the development of productive forces is stimulated by reorienting the priorities traditionally pursued in policies for the use of investments and labor and financial resources, so that, in agriculture, the investment cycle will be completed in all zones and the structure of production will correspond to the natural conditions and needs of the market, in accordance with economic conditions, so that the food industry and light industry will be first priority; in general, the production of consumer goods and their import should correspond to the purchasing power of the people, the cultural level of the workers and people and their current tastes and life styles; heavy industry should be developed according to possibilities, moving in moderation toward the most complete cycles and in the most effective directions; the technical and technological renewal should be carried out on a broad front in all branches of the economy and services.

The Party believes that the current and future transformations in economic relations will be achieved gradually and with the active participation of the state. It will make sure that the reform of the economic system for the transition to a market economy will invigorate the forces motivating society and protect the standard of living of the workers from the social consequences of the liberalization of prices and wages.

4. The most immediate tasks of our Party are to extricate the economy from its crisis, to return it to a normal work and production system, to satisfy the market's needs for essential commodities, to utilize existing capabilities, to achieve economic stability and balance, and to foster a spirit of optimism and confidence in the future.

The Party will aim, within a relatively short period of time, to ensure that the existing economic backwardness is overcome and that advanced levels are achieved in the social productivity of labor, in the well-being of the people and in the quality of life, in the creation of the necessary material and intellectual conditions for enhancing the personality of the individual. It will also aim to ensure that reserves are stimulated and the



functioning riches of the country are increased and that the free conversion of the country's currency into hard currency is achieved, etc.

The Party bases the achievement of its economic program, in the first place, on the economic and most effective use of all domestic resources, on the work of our people, on the revitalization of incentives and stimuli for work. These factors will be strengthened by means of assistance from and economic-financial cooperation with other countries.

#### IV. In the Social Field

The Workers Party is aware that the new stage of development into which our country has entered requires that our achievements in the social and cultural field be compared not only with our past but also with the achievements of other developed countries.

1. The basic objective of the Party policy in the social field will be to ensure a peaceful life with prospects for all. The Party will work to strengthen legal and economic guarantees of the protection of the individual and collective interests of the citizens. The Workers Party will work to ensure that the role of the state will be to protect the social dignity of the individual, creating the necessary legal conditions for every citizen to obtain an income by means of work or ownership; to ensure that each individual will be free to choose the profession and work which he desires, in the framework of pluralism of ownership and on the basis of his own capabilities; to ensure that he will always enjoy the protection of the state in regard to the social and economic interests which belong to him by law.

The Party will work to ensure that the state will not permit social or economic discrimination against the individual, under any circumstances.

2. The Workers Party considers the issue of the employment of able workers to be an important direction of its commitment. It will work to resolve this issue, increasing investments from our own resources and from foreign resources, stimulating the initiatives of collectives and individuals for new and fruitful activities in production and in services, in the form of cooperatives, partnerships, or private endeavors, as well as through the organized economic migration of citizens, and it will aim to ensure that this is in accordance with the interests of society and the individual.

In regard to the unemployed labor forces created in the villages, the Workers Party will work to ensure that they are employed by setting up local food industry and artisan units in the villages, by employing these workers in all other branches of the economy and services, and by developing tourism.

3. The Workers Party believes that, in order to normalize the housing situation for the population, there should be an expansion and modernization of the production of the necessary materials and of construction capabilities

and a reorientation of the country's construction production capacities; also, the construction of private homes should be encouraged and assisted and the regulations for the administration of state housing should be improved. It supports the enactment of the necessary measures for the urbanization of village zones.

4. The Party will support all measures which consolidate such important achievements as general education and free health care, aiming at their further qualitative improvement on all levels. It believes that the state should continue to finance and subsidize activity in these two vital fields of human interests.

In the field of education, it will work for the further consolidation of a democratic and public school system, on a modern scientific and pedagogical level.

In the health field, the Party believes that, in addition to increasing the prophylactic role of the health service, it is essential to radically improve all the dispensary structures and hospitals and to permit private practices.

5. The Workers Party favors the improvement of the pension system, of social security, and of state subsidies for some basic needs of the people. It wants the fiscal system to provide a fairer distribution of income, protecting and favoring the working class and families with low income, a number of children, etc. It supports the creation of the institution of social assistance.

6. The Party will work to increase labor productivity and to ensure that the contribution of each citizen will be accompanied by an increase in wages and other economic incentives. It will work to ensure that compensation for work, in every branch and sector of the economy, science, and culture will be free from bureaucratic limits and norms, which have resulted in the levelling of the contributions of workers, in a restrictive egalitarianism, and in the waning of the desire to work.

7. The Workers Party will work to ensure that the necessary economic, social, and juridical mechanisms are established for the strict respecting of normal working conditions in every branch of the economy and in all administrative, cultural, and scientific institutions. In particular, it is committed to the improvement of the Labor Code, so that it will properly protect the interests of all workers. In this framework, the Party will work so that the state, the trade unions, and the economic enterprises, on the basis of established legal norms, will set up a system for the economic protection of the unemployed. In accordance with the economic possibilities which will be created, the Workers Party will seek the reduction of the hours in the work week.

8. The Party favors the narrowing of economic and social differences between the city and the village. It considers the best possible satisfaction of the social interests of the villages to be a priority task of the state. It aims to ensure that the villages will receive significant investments for the considerable improvement of the transportation and communications system, for raising the level of trade

and communal services, for the general improvement in the lifestyle and the quality of cultural and artistic life.

9. The Workers Party will work with all forces for the further emancipation of Albanian women, providing them with new opportunities for more extensive participation in social, political, and economic life. It will seek the establishment of modern legislation for the protection of the specific interests and requirements of women, especially in the production sector. The Party will also work to ensure that women are liberated from the burden of housework, by seeking, for this purpose, to increase investments in light industry and the food industry, in services, etc. In accordance with the possibilities which will be created, the Party will support the adoption of new measures for increasing attention to mother and child and for creating the necessary conditions for family reproduction in accordance with individual desires.

10. The Workers Party considers the young age of the population to be one of the advantages for our present and future development. It wants all the necessary conditions to be created for the youth for education, culture and training, so that they will receive scientific and professional knowledge, and so they can have broad opportunities for advancement and orientation for their future. The Party wants extensive possibilities for relaxation and recreation to be created for the youth.

11. The Party is in favor of modern development in the field of culture and science, with the aim of enriching and opening up the broadest horizons for the intellectual life of the people. It is in favor of freedom of religious beliefs and practices.

It is in favor of the expansion of contacts with the advanced countries in the areas of culture and science. In this entire process of reciprocal communication, the Party maintains its well-known view about the protection of the national identity of our culture, literature, and arts, in order to always serve the interests of the people.

12. Giving a high evaluation to the role of science, culture, literature, and the arts, the Party will work for an increase in the role of the creative activity of the intelligentsia in our life, so that a new understanding of its place in society will take root and will be put into practice. On this road, the Workers Party will combat any concept underestimating the role of the intelligentsia, which has resulted in the leveling of its values and contributions in various fields of life, in the limitation of its participation in political and social life, often transforming the intelligentsia into a simple implementer of party or state decisions and directives. The Workers Party will commit itself to increasing the social and economic value of intellectual activity in accordance with real value and effectiveness which it provides, recognizing author's rights not only for writers and artists but also for engineers, agronomists, economists, physicians, etc.

13. The Workers Party will work for the perfecting and observance of the legislation on the protection of the ecological purity of the environment, looking at this issue, in the first place, as a direct obligation of the state and of all economic subjects. In this framework, it will ask the enterprises for complex studies in industrial zones to stipulate measures and investments for improving ecological parameters now and in the future.

#### V. In the Foreign Policy Field

1. The Workers Party is the initiator of an active and open foreign policy, of the expansion of the contacts of our country with the world and, in general, of a new concept of relations with foreign countries.

The foreign policy of the Albanian Workers Party has been and will be consistent in the protection of the highest interests of the homeland, its freedom, independence, and national sovereignty, as well as the preservation of the inviolable territorial integrity and of the legal rights due to it as an equal subject of the international community.

It will be a policy of friendship with all other peoples and a policy of noninterference in their internal affairs and cooperation based on mutual advantage and equality. In every situation and in every case, it will aim to protect the life of our people and their peaceful work.

The Workers Party will strive to ensure that Albania is ranked among and remains among the democratic and progressive forces which struggle for the protection of general peace and security. It will work so that our people will always support peoples who struggle for their national and social liberation, for democracy and progress.

2. The Party will work so that our country will become an active participant in the European security and cooperation process and so that all the agreements reached by consensus will be implemented.

The Workers Party supports the efforts which the CSCE is making for the creation of a system which will guarantee the security and defense of all European states. It will strive to ensure not only that Albania is included in this system but also that it makes its contribution to its strengthening and consolidation, with the desire that it will create a real atmosphere of confidence among peoples and certain conditions for avoiding disputes and conflicts, from which our old continent has suffered so much.

In the framework of the European security and cooperation process, the PPSH will be ready to support and assist all those initiatives, no matter where they might come from, which aim for disarmament and the control of weapons, the strengthening of the mutual security measures and the elimination of the danger of war. It will work so that our state will make its contribution to the existing institutions and to those which might be created in the future for the achievement of these objectives.

3. Economic cooperation with Europe, the integration of our country in the many types of European economic processes which are being constructed constitute a long-term strategy for the Workers Party; the Party believes that the changes in the laws which have taken place in our country in connection with the forms of ownership in Albania, with the guaranteeing of foreign investments and foreign business operations, have created the necessary groundwork for the profitable and fruitful cooperation of our country with foreign countries.

Our Party is determined to move forward on this road, convinced that it will propel us to the elevation and rapid advancement of the economy and the improvement of the lives of the people. It will work so that our legal personnel, who regulate economic relations with foreign countries, will be expanded and continually improved according to the needs, which will emerge from our own experience and from international experience, which is constantly in movement, and also in order to protect the highest national interests.

4. The Workers Party, keeping in mind the age-old European traditions of our people, will always be open to the progressive cultural trends on our continent and in the whole world and to the assimilation and application of the results of the technical and scientific revolution. Our Party will strive to ensure that our men of science, culture, and the arts are integrated into these trends. It is for the development of intensive exchanges with others, for intellectual enrichment and for the consolidation of common values, both old and new. In these exchanges the Party will work to protect and continually strengthen our national identity and our cultural and intellectual originality, as an independent subject in the community and in international relations.

5. The PPSH is in favor of and will be in favor of the democratization of international relations, so that the voice of all countries, large and small, will be heard and will be taken into consideration. It has held and will hold the position that the norms regulating relations between states should be the result of the opinion, experiences, and contribution of all the people in the world. It is in favor of friendly and equal relations with all countries, unconditional and based on mutual respect, noninterference in internal affairs and fruitful cooperation, with mutual benefit for each party. It will follow the course of ensuring that independence of judgement and action should be preserved in all relations with foreign countries, while not involving the country in any agreement or contract which will harm its national sovereignty, the right of the people to decide for themselves in regard to their present and future.

6. The policy for strengthening friendly relations with our neighbors represents a permanent and unchanging guideline of our Party. Albania has tied its fate with many historic, economic and cultural and, especially, geopolitical threads in the Balkans. The strengthening of the securing of peace and cooperation in this region is in the best interest of all its peoples. On the basis of this, the

Albanian Workers Party will work to ensure that the process of Balkan cooperation which has begun and in which Albania is an active participant is enlarged and expanded in all fields and covers all sectors. It will keep the opinion and sound logic that conflicts and disputes among the Balkan countries, especially ethnic conflicts, cannot be eliminated by old formulas or mindsets, but by a new political will which must be in accordance with new concepts and with the spirit of European security and cooperation. The PPSH will continue to pursue, in the future, its policy in regard to minorities, as a bridge leading to alliances, peace, and cooperation among the Balkan countries.

7. The foreign policy which the Workers Party will pursue will be a noncomplex, contemporary policy. If anyone wants to offer us a hand in friendship, regardless of whether it is a large or small, poor, or rich country, regardless of which political party is in control and which system it belongs to, we will not refuse them.

We support the establishment of diplomatic relations with those countries with which we do not have relations yet and we are for their extension to all countries, without prejudice and without any underestimation.

8. The Albanian Workers Party is in favor of pluralistic democracy in all fields, for dialog and public debate among the various political forces. But it will be opposed to and will not accept the interference of foreigners and their mediation to determine the truth. The Albanian people must be the masters in their own country and they should solve political problems themselves with their thought and will.

9. The PPSH is in favor of the establishment of contacts and cooperation with leftist and progressive parties which are working for social progress, freedom, and peace in the world.

#### **Demands of Union of Independent Trade Unions**

91P20347A Tirana SINDIKALISTI in Albanian  
18 Apr 91 p 3

[Unattributed article: "The Trade Unions Confront the Law-Governed State: To the Council of Ministers, for the Information of the Presidium of the People's Assembly"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The Union of Independent Albanian Trade Unions [BSPSh] issues the following demands to the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the People's Assembly:

1. The wages of workers should be increased by 50 percent in all branches of the economy and in the fields of education, culture, and health. This increase should be calculated on the basis of the salary which each person is receiving now

2. Personal pensions and disability pensions should be increased by 50 percent.

3. In situations where there is a lack of raw materials, workers should be paid 100 percent of their basic wages.

4. Women should not work on the third shift and they should work a six-hour workday.

5. The distribution of food products should be guaranteed by the use of coupons and this should include milk.

6. Vacation camp tickets, cabins, authorizations for television sets, washing machines, and refrigerators should be distributed to enterprises and institutions in proper proportion to the number of workers.

7. The executive committees should not get any percentage of the money for palaces, built by voluntary contribution, which are under construction or which are earmarked for construction.

8. The crimes which were committed at the time of the recent events in Shkoder should be denounced in the press and on radio and television; the killers of innocent victims should be tried openly and pensions should be given to the victims' families.

9. The BSPSh trade union should be given all the economic data on the enterprise, institution, district, and national levels, so that it will be able to reach the appropriate conclusions for the protection of the rights and interests of the workers. Conditions should be created for the trade union organs in enterprises and institutions on permanent results in production, the creation of income and earnings, and the analysis of the situation in enterprises and institutions [as published]. With clear positions and demands, the trade union organ should be an equal partner to the management structures in the enterprises and institutions.

10. The BSPSh trade union should be permitted, by means of information media such as radio and television, to inform the public about its positions, activities, and ideas, without any type of censorship.

11. In accordance with their religious affiliation, workers should be permitted to celebrate holy days freely, unless the technological work process does not allow this. In all these cases, the workers should receive their full pay.

12. The law on collective labor contracts should be approved. The BSPSh will sign these contracts, stipulating the bases for signing the contracts. The collective contracts which will be concluded between the independent trade unions and representatives of the ownership should include and present exact statements of all the rights and duties of the workers, from the real value of labor to job protection, the condition and manner of establishing labor relations, wages and minimum wages, the work schedule, vacations and labor safety, the rights, obligations, and responsibilities of workers in regard to the completion of their work assignments, in regard to information, management, the interruption of work, the right to protest and to go on strike.

13. The state should respect the independence of the trade unions and take measures so that the immunity of representatives of the independent trade unions will be recognized and guaranteed.

14. The state should regulate, by law, the standards for the protection of workers on the job so that coercive measures will not be used in enterprises and institutions, so that strikebreaking will be prohibited by law, so that lockout, as a method of exerting pressure on workers, will be prohibited by law in cases in which the state is the employer.

15. The independent trade unions have committed themselves to opposing the presence of various political parties (organizations) in enterprises and institutions and they are opposed to the evaluation of trade union activity on the basis of political criteria. Financing by parties, social organizations, etc. should be prohibited, except for initial financing.

We hope that these demands will be satisfied with understanding. To satisfy them, the BSPSh will use all democratic methods and will not rule out its ultimate method—the strike.

Note: Various deadlines have been set for satisfying these demands, from 15 April to 15 May 1991.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### Dienstbier Meets With PLO's Abu Mazin

LD2105200991 Bratislava Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas Radio Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] Jiri Dienstbier, deputy federal prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, received Abu Mazin [Mahmud 'bbas], member of the PLO Executive Committee in charge of domestic political and international relations, in Prague today. He briefed Jiri Dienstbier on the PLO stance on possible variants for solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. According to CTK the CSFR side regards some of these views as interesting.

### Slovakia's Knazko Seeks 'International' Treaty

LD2205211391 Prague CTK in English 1524 GMT 22 May 91

[Text] Bratislava May 22 (CTK)—The Czech and the Slovak Republics "must conclude a treaty which will have the validity of an international legal document," ex-Slovak External Relations Minister and senior representative of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia Milan Knazko told journalists here today. "Slovakia's sovereignty would give the republic the occasion to become a full-fledged member of the community of the nations of Europe and the world, to enter into equal partnership with other countries," Knazko said. "However, this need not necessarily imply the disintegration of the common state of Czechs and Slovaks," he added.



According to Knazko, a state treaty must specify to the last detail the form of a new constitutional setup of Czechoslovakia.

#### **CPCZ Chief Interviewed by Bulgarian Paper**

*4U2305104491 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 20 May 91 pp 1-2*

[Interview with Pavol Kanis, chairman of the Federal Council of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, by Boyko Vulkov; place and date not given: "We Are the Democratic Party of Free People"]

[Excerpts] [Vulkov] Would you like to point out the most important elements of the CSFR's present development?

[Kanis] A change of the system is taking place in the CSFR, just as in the other former socialist states. This is a transition from a centralized administrative system of social leadership toward a market economy and pluralistic democracy. [passage omitted]

[Vulkov] What are the basic changes within the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ]?

[Kanis] After November 1989 the party underwent a fundamental political and organizational change. From being a single-center organization we became two independent republican parties. In Bohemia—there is the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, and in Slovakia—the Party of the Democratic Left. The two organizations have a common federal council consisting of 24 members. However, this does not mean that they are developing in an identical manner. Now I am chairman of the council, next year it will be Comrade Grebenicek, who is deputy chairman.

We have rejected the principle of democratic centralism, which in our country turned into bureaucratic centralism. Today we are a democratic party of free people. I think that we had to lose in order to become normal people again. This defeat forced us to reassess everything that we had until now. I think that the idea of socialism has not died. However, the way it has been implemented up to now has compromised it. The future will show what the valuable elements of the idea were. Those elements will prevail. We adhere to democratic socialism.

[Vulkov] What are your party's basic tasks?

[Kanis] First of all we are struggling to achieve the confidence of the people again. We lost it because the contradiction between words and deeds became great. Now we are an opposition force and must learn to conduct policy in accordance with this situation. We do not subscribe to the slogan "the worse it is the better it is." We understand that many of the present problems are a result of the transient monopoly on power. On the other hand, however, we do not intend to ignore the mistakes of the present leadership. Our basic thought is that the scope and importance of the issues that the

CSFR resolves today require a national consensus, and we are striving for this goal. There are many similar examples in West Europe, and we must make use of them.

Our party thinks that the transition toward a market economy and privatization is a matter of 10-15 years, and therefore, we criticize the ideological approach toward these issues. The promises of rapid prosperity are tempting but unreal, and the people must know this. We support privatization under conditions of giving priority in purchasing shares to the people working in the specific relevant units, so that they do not become prey to a small group of rich people or to a new state bureaucracy. We insist on preparing a new constitution and we will cooperate in this matter. This constitution must resolve all the aforementioned issues and guarantee the country's democratic future. [passage omitted]

#### **Revival Club Terminates Activities**

*LD2105170991 Prague Ceskoslovenskij Rozhlas Radio Network in Czech 1030 GMT 21 May 91*

[Text] The Revival Club [Klub Obroda] has decided to terminate its activity. This was announced at today's briefing in Prague by the club's chairman, Milos Hajek. He also said that some of its members joined the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, some wanted to cooperate within the Masaryk Workers Academy. All deputies who were members of Obroda joined the Club of Social Democratic Orientation [Klub Socialne Demokraticke Orientace] and the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party.

### **POLAND**

#### **Walesa, Bielecki, Balcerowicz Hold Talks**

*4U2105214791 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 15 May 91 p 1*

[Article by D.P.: "Concerning Social Moods and the Economy"]

[Text] On 14 May President Lech Walesa received Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki and Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz at a lunch at the Belweder Palace. The prime minister frequently visits President Lech Walesa in the morning.

Judging by the expressions on the faces of Jan Krzysztof Bielecki and Leszek Balcerowicz as they left the Belweder, the meeting must have taken place in a good, friendly atmosphere. The communique issued by the president's press office states that they "discussed the current socioeconomic situation in the country." Presidential Spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski said the following about the meeting:

"It took the form of a briefing. It took place, because of the somewhat heightened mood of tension in the country and the protest actions that were recently announced.



The president wanted to hear the views of the prime minister and deputy prime minister on the mood of the country and to be briefed on the economic situation. There were no changes in President Lech Walesa's attitude toward the government in relation to what the president said during his recent television interview."

To remind readers, what he said then was: "I nominated this government and this prime minister, and I intend to help them. This prime minister really has great achievements to his credit, and he is heading in the right direction."

The meeting took place three days before the economists conference scheduled to take place at the Belweder Palace on Friday and Saturday [18-19 May]. There was a certain amount of tension surrounding preparations for the conference—the government could have felt threatened. Donald Tusk, one of the leaders of the Liberal-Democratic Congress even wrote that there was a danger that the government might be brought down. These fears have died down now. However, after a period of calm, strikes have once again broken out in some parts of the country. The latest figures of the Main Office of Statistics on the recession are also disturbing.

Solidarity has announced the staging of a protest action on 22 May.

The government is preparing moves that are intended to deal with negative economic phenomena, including the recession. It can be assumed that not all of these moves will be readily accepted by enterprises and parliament, which will discuss the state of the economy next week.

The mood in the country might not become calmer, but remain tense. Indeed, some observers even expect the mood of tension to increase. Tuesday's meeting at the Belweder undoubtedly served to defuse some of that tension, and one can see it as having given the government support.

### **Ministry on Repatriation of Poles From USSR**

*AU2305145791 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA  
in Polish 20 May 91 p 1*

[Article by Dariusz Fedor: "The Poles in the USSR—Will They Come Back?"]

[Text] Well-informed sources have intimated that the Ministry of Internal Affairs considers that there is a possibility of a further repatriation of Poles from the USSR. This would be the third repatriation since World War II. According to cautious estimates made by the ministry, such an action could involve between one and seven million people.

The first wave of possible repatriates would most probably consist of those USSR citizens whose official documents clearly state their nationality as being Polish. According to ministry estimates, there are several hundred thousand such people.

Additionally, there are over one million other USSR citizens whose official papers state some other nationality, but who feel themselves to be Polish.

There are another one million people who lived within the boundaries of pre-1939 Poland. This group could pose the greatest problem. Some of these people know Polish well, although they may be of another nationality (mainly Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Lithuanians). These people could prove to be typical economic emigrants who, given a chance, might choose to emigrate to Poland in order to flee from the economic crisis in the USSR.

The story of the Jewish emigration from the USSR to Israel provides a good illustration of this danger. It has recently transpired that about 30 percent of the USSR citizens who emigrated to Israel were not Jews at all.

"If we are confronted by a similar situation such cases will have to be decided by a statement of declared membership of the Roman Catholic Church," stated a ministry spokesman.

The last and the potentially largest group of possible repatriates are the descendants of all those people who were deported to Siberia in Tsarist times and all those Poles who for whatever reason found themselves in the USSR. These people are spread all over the Soviet Union. Ministry estimates say that there could be between three and five million such people and the ministry thinks that most of them could opt to emigrate to Poland.

There are many reasons why Poles in the USSR chose not to come back to Poland during former periods of repatriation (1944-48 and 1957-58). Some, especially those who lived in the more remote republics, were simply not told about the repatriation programs, whereas others—in direct contravention of agreed treaties—were not released from labor camps and prisons.

"Humanitarian, historical, and emotive grounds are the main reasons that support a program of repatriation of Poles. The main reason against [repatriation] is the current economic situation. For the most part, the potential repatriates are old and infirm people who managed to preserve their Polishness and held onto the idea of returning to Poland one day. Our moral duty is to assist them to do this. The issue of their return became particularly acute in April 1991 when the Czechoslovak Government began the repatriation of its citizens from the USSR," stated a high-ranking official at the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The repatriates could be resettled along the so-called eastern region in Poland and on some of the more run down state farms. The land from such state farms would have to be distributed among these people. They would also need access to special finance and receive tax concessions to help them to make a go of it.

Repatriation could not be something that could begin tomorrow. It would have to be preceded by very difficult and long-term intergovernmental negotiations. One would have to agree on the compensation for the property these people would leave behind and recalculate welfare entitlements. The Czechoslovak Government, for example, wishing to speed up the repatriation of its citizens from the USSR, decided to give up all claims in this respect. What could, however, be done today is to renounce the treaty with the USSR that prohibits the possession of dual citizenship and to increase support for Polish expatriate centers in the USSR, we were told by our ministry source.

**Monthly on Strategies of Political Figures: April**

91EP0463B Warsaw KONFRONTACJE in Polish  
No 3(39), Apr 91 pp 4-5

[From the "Our Opinion" column: "Political Games"]

[Text]

**Jacek Kuron**

In contrast to many of his colleagues, he is not a defeated political figure. The entire strength of his political personality is in his "immunity." Kuron will survive all cataclysms, although he will feel them deeply. How is this apparent? Kuron cannot do without politics, just as a fish cannot live long without water. Thus we are dealing with a political creature of much inner strength and passion. In assessing Kuron, one must say that he is very likely the only fully mature politician on the left side of the Solidarity camp. His colleagues either suffer from humbuggery or wallow in words and emotions more suited to "salons" than the political ring. Is he also sensible and flexible? Here one might have fundamental reservations. Kuron, like his entire camp, is too entrenched in positions of departure for the presidential campaign of [former] Prime Minister Mazowiecki. He is lying in wait for a battle that was decided a long time ago. But in contrast to the rest, he is beginning to shout louder and louder that something is not right. And that is the hope! Kuron may, for who knows which time, become a "revisionist," and under today's conditions this is a very valuable posture. Kuron does not occupy himself with definitions. He bursts into activity, crying enough words already, actions are needed. There is hope that Kuron will break out ahead of the pack and begin to create accomplished facts that will draw the entire Kuron-Mazowiecki formation out of the realm of powerless laments and futile curses. Kuron is one of the most distinguished politicians of the left side of the Polish political scene.

**Andrzej Drzycimski**

One of the few professionals at Belweder who treats his work seriously. For the conviction has become generally accepted that the function of a press spokesman cannot have much in common with responsibility, that ultimately this may be art for art's sake, not a political game.

It is not easy to be Walesa's spokesman. First, because the president's style of exercising authority imposes an obligation of constant vigilance; the paths on which Walesa moves as president of all Poles are exceptionally intricate. And so a spokesman should be not only a well-informed person, but also the first politician who checks, before Walesa, the variants that are to be accepted by him. Second, because the president likes to emphasize his opinion, which he keeps secret from his colleagues, in order to surprise them with an unexpected tactical volt. So Drzycimski must know when to refrain from commenting, when to release a leak and when to inundate public opinion with statements issued in the president's name. Walesa would like not the unobjective political situation but he, personally and individually, to shape the political system. Drzycimski promotes him rather intelligently. For example, he separates precisely the politics of the Office of the President from the politics of the president himself. And in the public's perception, Belweder's so-called information policy is becoming more and more clear. But Drzycimski should pay attention to the speed of the reaction. If up to now we have had spokesmen disposed toward spectacular action, now there has emerged a politician who interprets the president's tactics competently, to the extent the president wants to reveal the scene.

**Wladyslaw Frasyniuk**

A politician of union origin who thus has great opportunities to achieve real influence on the electorate. Yet, many uncertainties are arising in relation to his candidacy. Because he was drawn into the political game with a clear bias, "during the war at the top," to offset Walesa's importance and influence. But a politician who was forced to be anti-Walesa loses the sense of his own identity. The other issue is whether Frasyniuk counted on remaining in the circle of people and problems from which he grew. Rather not, one can see today. As a worker he was prepared to fulfill a certain political role, which he could not bear, and so an outstanding union leader became an average political leader. The only intriguing thing is his very specific relationship with Mazowiecki. It appears that he has a relationship with the former prime minister that goes well beyond social arrangements. It is highly likely that Frasyniuk and Mazowiecki will conduct their election campaign together. One cannot underestimate this. On the other hand, Frasyniuk's position on many sociotechnological issues is marked by distrust. He turns up rather infrequently in the mass media and avoids public statements. Perhaps this springs from his worker complex, but probably more from the emptiness of the platform that has come into being in his political camp. Frasyniuk is a man of action, which is worth remembering.

**Lech Walesa**

He is beginning his international round, but he can afford to. Mainly because he has an established strategy for dealing with a strong opposition. He simply suggests to them substitute issues, in which the opposition eagerly

gets involved. Walesa also confirms time after time that he is "president of all Poles." So he has achieved a state of political stability as far as his own position in the system of power is concerns. This does not free the president himself from executing pointed tactics for modeling his ranks according to a diminishing system of power. The president exhibits a strong temptation to make gestures toward the Krakow-Mazowiecki option. Yet it is not looking for gestures, but rather incumbencies. Walesa must resolve this favorably, especially because there is growing at his side, yet beyond his control, the force of a uncontrolled union camp.

#### **Jan Krzysztof Bielecki**

He is relying heavily on the status quo, although the more he strives for it, the more often the president threatens a crisis. So he finds himself in a situation of moral and political stalemate, from which he can exit only through negotiations with the presidential camp. Will he want to modify his socioeconomic policy? He can do this in his strategic plan, which requires the smallest compromises.

#### **Jaroslav Kaczynski**

He is undoubtedly the prime actor of the political game. He is putting his own individual party into place. On one hand it is a ploy against the postcommunist and post-Solidarity left, and on the other, against his own party, which is advancing on Kaczynski with a bundle of radical legislation. For the time being, he will be able to get out of this oppression in one piece, even consolidate his authority. But he cannot rely on Walesa's confirmation that he is the vice president, which does not mean that the scope of the authority he has is inadequate to be aware of it. Given the penetration of leftist forces, he will threaten resignation or moving to the opposition. These will be spectacular gestures, but Kaczynski likes to bluff.

#### **Bronislaw Geremek**

Leader of the realists in the Krakow-Mazowiecki camp. He can always count on to open the entry gates to Belweder, even over the "dead body" of Jaroslav Kaczynski, but he prefers to wait until the parliamentary elections and a new power structure, because then he will have beside him several loyal comrades. He exhibits a clear aversion to the solo game, although he is testing several varieties.

#### **Adam Michnik**

A politician torn between tactics demanding the building of a genuine alliance with the left and the principles such an alliance would render impossible. A typical parliamentary player.

#### **Marian Krzaklewski**

Perhaps the leader of a strong opposition to "politicians." He did not allow himself to be drawn into the Belweder camp. He has his own plans and ambitions,

which he is not revealing now. A powerful figure preparing for confrontation with Walesa and his people. Will excessive individualism be his undoing?

#### **Monthly on Strategies of Political Camps: April**

91EP0463A Warsaw KONFRONTACJE in Polish No 4(39), Apr 91 p 4

[From the "Our Opinion" Column: "Political Games"]

[Text]

#### **Belweder Camp**

It may be a stabilizer between the president and the presidential camp. Its opportunities lie in the composition of its staff—it gathers politicians who play against each other but are united by the interests of a concrete political elite. In the Belweder camp a division of roles and ranges of activity in the political system is taking place. Also, serious conflicts arising from the political game over influence and authority are being resolved. But the danger still exists that the Belweder camp, as a place for strategic decisions, may be torn apart too often by the ambitions and antagonisms of individual politicians and their groups. A well-founded demand for expanding the composition of the Belweder camp with a few people who are in opposition to the presidential camp is being issued, mainly for offsetting a dangerous inclination toward one political form. The president is leaning toward this and is preparing Belweder for an airing out. Trusted people from Solidarity can fulfill the role of "post office boxes."

#### **Presidential Camp**

It will not come to terms with the balance of powers proposed by Walesa. It will begin a new stage of the "war at the top," this time in defense of its captured positions. It is doubtful that the president would support the leaders of the presidential camp at the same time, but neither will he "stir them up," since they fulfill the useful role of "monster." He is comfortable with this, since the people on whom he really relies will enter Belweder fighting with the presidential camp. Walesa knows that nothing lifts the spirits like an atmosphere of battle and victory.

#### **Walesa Camp**

It has become the clear opposition to the politicians of part of Solidarity. It questions "politics," regardless of their source, since it equates political activity with the arrogance of authority. It is directed toward union methods. The Walesa camp has become the center for lesser activists with local ambitions; this does not mean that, as a whole, it does not express a certain political direction, which cannot be disregarded before the parliamentary elections. The talk here is of regionalization and atomization of the larger post-Solidarity camp, and this is an important signal to the biggest political parties.

### **Government Camp**

It is very likely that Walesa, in leaving the scene of Polish politics and becoming involved in world politics, will set the clock of political conflicts "at the top," such that the government camp will clash with the presidential camp. It is not certain whether this scenario will come to pass, since in the president's absence, the second person of state is the prime minister, a kindly person with reasonable political ambitions who would prefer to have tranquility in order to prove himself in the plan for economic reforms. Therefore, he will want to come to terms with the leaders of the presidential camp, but can he count on understanding? Nevertheless, the threat of a cabinet crisis hangs in the air. The government camp will survive in mostly unchanged form until the parliamentary elections, taking advantage of the quiet support of all political forces and the president himself.

### **Krakow-Mazowiecki Camp**

It will try very hard to reach Belweder through the kitchen door, but the president will delineate a "war-path" on the principle that it is better to talk with winners than perpetual losers. The president's tactics will not always be well understood. Against this background, a party of fundamentalists declining all contacts, and of realists aiming to conquer Belweder before the parliamentary elections, will be created. But a frontal attack is doubtful. The politicians of this camp will seek out a place among various parliamentary spheres directed against the presidential camp.

### **Union Camp**

It has been impossible to write the union camp into a concrete political option, to the dissatisfaction of the president and the friendly interest of the Krakow-Mazowiecki camp. Together with the Walesa camp, it wants to build a strong electoral coalition capable of frustrating the formations of all groups. In this configuration, it has great opportunities for parliamentary victory.

### **Peasant Camp**

The specter of collapse obscures its tactical work before the elections. A solution to the problem of political leadership is important; without it, one cannot imagine its realizing its ambition of joint control of the state in a center-right coalition.

### **KONFRONTACJE Political Tidbits: April**

91EP04591 Warsaw *KONFRONTACJE* in Polish  
No 4(39), Apr 91 pp 4-5

[Article from the "Leaks" column]

[Text]

### **From the Polish Socialist Party [PPS]**

"It is impossible to reactivate the party in its previous form. Jan Jozef Lipski and Lidia Ciolkoszowa do not

guarantee influence on the younger generation; thus, the activists of the former Polish Socialist Party-Democratic Revolution [PPS-RD] are forming a new party which will include the Intercity Anarchists and the Movement for an Alternative Society. Piotr Ikonowicz sees Andrzej Malanowski as head of the united party, but the latter has come out in support of Lipski. Malanowski and Lipski, on the one hand, and Bugaj and Milkowski, on the other, are planning to unite, but not as an interparty alliance. The point is to unite their prestige and authority since these activists have proposed forming a personal alliance with Tadeusz Fiszbach, but not with his party. Fiszbach is a known, important political figure, but his party symbolizes the old order."

### **From Center Accord [PC]**

"The regional and local structures of Center Accord have been given the task of analyzing the nomenclatura enterprises and partnerships and gathering the appropriate documentation on abuses by the economic units and their connections with the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki. The press organs of Center Accord are to support grassroots efforts and to support pressure for the adoption of a law aimed at 'Red business.' The coordinator for this action is to be Jozef Orzel of the editorial staff at TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC."

### **From the President's Chancellery**

"Bogdan Borusewicz is to become minister of state for security affairs, but he must resign from all union positions. The president would, however, be able to hire Borusewicz in the second half of 1991. There is talk of Deputy Mieczyslaw Gil, previously chairman of the Citizens Parliamentary Club [OKP], moving to the president's chancellery."

### **From the Supreme Chamber of Control**

"The makeshift situation is causing confusion in the bodies of state control. Among the most recent rumors the one about the dissolution of the entire institution and the formation of new bodies of state control by the new Sejm is the most important. Deputy Maciej Bednarkiewicz of the OKP is supposed to be named the liquidator. Another rumor says that Deputy Mieczyslaw Gil, OKP chairman, is to become president of the Supreme Chamber of Control."

### **From the Office of the Council of Ministers**

"Minister Adam Glapinski intends to leave Center Accord [PC], because he is disappointed with the pre-election tactics of the party. He has voiced increasingly sharp criticism of the acceleration of the elections and of the organization of pressure, which discredits the PC. Glapinski has come out against Jacek Maziarz's domination among the officers of Center Accord. Maziarz



is using dictatorial methods. The minister intends to take some economic activists from the structures of Center Accord and on this basis create an apolitical pre-election block."

#### From Center Accord [PC]

"Some outstanding activists of the Polish Social Democratic Union [PUS] are wondering whether to break with their party, to form a socioliberal group and even before the elections to join Center Accord. Jaroslaw Kaczynski himself is sympathetic to such ideas."

#### From the Ministry of Finance

"The next stage in currency reform is external convertibility of the zloty; then the Ministry of Finance will begin the complicated operation of exchanging the currency. Four variants of currency exchange are being developed, but the most probable is a model based on the future exchange rate and the strength of the currency in terms of a basket of European currencies, the so-called ECU. European financial institutions are pressing for such a solution. The exchange of currency will not be possible prior to 1995, i.e., after Poland settles its membership in European institutions. Graphic designs for the new currency, which will serve along with the European currency, are being prepared."

#### From the Democratic Union [UD]

"Piotr Nowina-Konopka, secretary general of the Democratic Union, will not participate in the parliamentary elections as a candidate. He wants to devote himself to party activities, but he is counting on receiving an important government position in the future. The initial list of candidates for the parliamentary elections includes 120 names, but proposals for supplementing the list with regional activists are still coming in. The names of Zbigniew Bujak and Henryk Wujec are not among them."

#### Opinion Poll on Trade Unions, Political Parties

LD2305024291 Warsaw PAP in English 2058 GMT  
22 May 91

[Text] Warsaw May 22—Forty-one percent of the respondents declared their approval for the Solidarity trade union during an opinion poll carried out by the Public Opinion Polling Centre [OBOP] on May 13 and 14. Fifteen percent voiced their disapproval, whereas 42 percent said they were indifferent towards the union. Solidarity of Individual Farmers met with approval of 40 percent of the polled, Solidarity 80—31 percent, the Democratic Union—22 percent, the Centre Alliance and the All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions [All-Poland Trade Union Agreement—OPZZ]—18 percent each. Party X won approval of 7 percent of the respondents, thus placing 18th among 20 organizations included in the survey.

#### POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup: 21-27 Apr

91EP0445A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 17  
27 Apr 91 p 2

[Excerpts]

#### National News

[passage omitted] The leaders of the peasant groups have signed a declaration of unified action and formed an election coalition. For the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], President Roman Bartoszcze signed the declaration; for the Polish Peasant Party "Solidarity" [PSL "S"], President Jozef Shisz; for the Trade Union of Farmers "Solidarity" [ZZR "S"] [as published], Chairman Gabriel Janowski. It was announced that the decision of the leaders had been approved by the presidiums of the organizations represented.

Some of the members of the Citizens Movement-Democratic Action (KOAD) opposed to unification with the Democratic Union (UD) have formed a political party: the Democratic-Social Movement [RDS]. Zbigniew Bujak was elected chairman. The new party wants to defend the workers' interests and considers Lipski's Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and Labor Solidarity its natural allies.

The Sejm was unable to elect a president of the Supreme Chamber of Control. Among the candidates—Jan Komornicki of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] received 142 votes, and Andrzej Wybranski [Citizens Parliamentary Club [OKP] and Center Accord [PC]] received 127. An absolute majority of 154 votes was needed. The voting was mixed.

A meeting in Warsaw in front of the office of the OPZZ [All-Poland Trade Union Agreement] on Kopernik St ended the protest action of the unionists that has lasted since 15 February 1991. Representatives of the protest committees from seven cities in which demonstrations had previously been held were present. Prime Minister J.K. Bielecki received the unionists.

Mikolaj Kozakiewicz, the Sejm marshal, received representatives of the Union of the Homeless, including Roman Nowicki, its chairman. More than 1.5 million families do not have their own apartments, and, in 1991, about two apartments for every 1,000 population will be completed, which "is a result embarrassing in the eyes of Europe." R. Nowicki declared that the Union is demanding the urgent calling of a Sejm session devoted to construction problems. A proposal was made that advance payments to housing accounts be treated in the same manner as advance payments for cars.

The first quarter of 1991 was worse for the economy than it was during the first quarter of 1990 or during the last quarter of 1990. According to information K. Lutostanski, deputy president of Central Office of Statistics, gave journalists, production fell by 4.3 percent in comparison with the first quarter of 1990 and by 15.2 percent in comparison with the fourth quarter of 1990. Enterprise

SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, which will be published beginning in June 1991 in a Polish edition. [passage omitted]

## ROMANIA

### Birladeanu on Prominent Front Leaders, Reform

91B40631A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian  
16 Apr 91 p 2

[Interview with Senate President Alexandru Birladeanu by Corina Dragotescu, place and date not given: "As Long as Things Are Done Backstage, We Won't Have a Democracy"]

[Text] [Dragotescu] Mr. Alexandru Birladeanu, just to make sure that we call a spade a spade, I think it would be good if you began this discussion by defining your relations with Messrs. Ion Iliescu, Petre Roman, and Silviu Brucan. So, taking them in order, what are your relations with Mr. Ion Iliescu?

[Birladeanu] I have known Mr. Iliescu for a long time ever since he was very young. He was a promising young man, something that was in fact later confirmed. I knew him as a very knowledgeable man, frank, smart, and honest and I think he is still like that. There was a long hiatus in our relations after I left public life in 1968. For close to 20 years I saw him only once or twice by chance. But I followed his development and career and they did not disprove my opinion of him.

I still hold the same opinion. Of course, as president there are new demands made on him in addition to what we expected from him before. If you ask me, he must show greater determination and firmness. I reproached him that he is sometimes too kind, too gentle, perhaps even weak at times. I didn't like the fact that speaking about my declaration, first he pronounced, "Mr. Birladeanu made a mistake," but then he pulled back adding, "But I'm not interfering." If he's not interfering, he shouldn't interfere at all. But if he does make a pronouncement, then he shouldn't retract it. Still, these are small incidents. I think that at the time he in fact didn't correctly appreciate this issue of mixing party and state or didn't appreciate it in its true proportions. Such a mixture is something that must be categorically eliminated.

[Dragotescu] Have relations between you and him been more tense lately?

[Birladeanu] There are some differences of opinion, but not of principle. We've been consulting, we've been arguing, but that is only natural when you cooperate and work together.

[Dragotescu] What can you tell us about your relations with Mr. Petre Roman?

[Birladeanu] I have nothing personal with Mr. Petre Roman. I knew his father 50 years ago before Petre was

even born. So I had every reason to watch his development with sympathy and to like him. He is intelligent, probably good at his profession, and well educated. I couldn't have been anything else coming from a family like Walter Roman's. But I don't agree with some of his methods. I also don't agree with the fact that he is not loyal. Not so much toward me, because he had no reason to be loyal to me, but to the president. I won't now cite examples, although I could if it was needed. That is the first thing I reproached him and the first disappointment I had about Petre Roman. Second, I think that he took on airs too quickly. The power has too easily gone to his head and made him make mistakes. He may be very smart, but he still is not experienced in leadership. So all my disagreements with Petre Roman stem only from matters of principle.

[Dragotescu] And your relations with Mr. Silviu Brucan?

[Birladeanu] Concerning Mr. Brucan, I met him about the beginning of the 1950's, but I never had anything to do with him. I worked in the economic area and he was in ideology, propaganda, press, and radio. We seldom had an opportunity to meet. Since I didn't know him, I can't say that I either liked or disliked him. I got to know him more closely on the occasion of the letter of the six. At that time Apostol put me in touch with Brucan. He came to see me about twice, because I was to give him several ideas to include in the letter. After the letter was published we were separated by the fact that each one of us was put under home arrest. My great disillusion came after the revolution. First there was his unjust attitude toward Apostol. Second, the fact that he tried to arrogate the authorship and merit for that letter. I think that if there was merit, it belonged to everyone. That's where my disagreements with him started. At some point he also tried to blackmail me in a way, but never mind... I realized that he is too haughty and is capable of delivering and placing many untruths. To me he has become a man I don't trust.

[Dragotescu] Knowing all this now, please tell us: Do you feel ignored in politics?

[Birladeanu] Not at all. I cannot feel ignored because I don't have political ambitions. I've said so before. I was drawn into politics, into the politics of the past few months, by mistake, so to speak. Then I thought I could be of some help, so I said to myself, "OK, if I'm asked, I will help." Beyond that I have absolutely no ambitions and I don't feel slighted. The fact that I didn't have and don't have any role in the Front is because I didn't want to play any role. I even asked for that, because at my age one's strength is limited.

[Dragotescu] Nevertheless, could it be that the declaration you made in Senate came of a desire to "come out in front" and to call attention to yourself?

[Birladeanu] No! Dear me! You know what I was doing in making that declaration? What a physician does who has invented a medicine and is experimenting with it on himself. I realized that the statute, those two provisions

I talked about—there are others, too—is antidemocratic. So I thought I would criticize them, stick some pins in them, and the proof that the medicine worked was that I was promptly ousted from the party. That demonstrated that what I said was correct, because for example: Where is the freedom of opinion, where is the freedom to express a view? One is immediately ousted. So I didn't seek to promote myself, but I put my own person on the line. As Mr. Secares and others in the Front leadership stated, what is on line is my position as president of the Senate. I agree not to continue as president of the Senate, of course if the senators request it.

[Dragotescu] So you were ousted from the Front without any right of appeal.

[Birladeanu] I have not been told that I had any such right.

[Dragotescu] In this situation, don't you think that your position as president of the Senate is uncertain?

[Birladeanu] Why uncertain? I was elected by the senators by secret ballot.

[Dragotescu] In practice, a member of the majority party is elected president of the Senate, so...

[Birladeanu] That's about the case normally. Of course, the majority itself elects its president. It is not obligatory that the president be a member of the majority party. There is no such law, nor do our Senate bylaws envisage such an obligation.

[Dragotescu] Why did you want to make that political declaration in the Senate? Did you want it to be put up for debate?

[Birladeanu] I was outraged when I read the statute and I said I couldn't not take a position against this statute. My first thought was to issue a statement to the press, but I thought that, having been elected by the senators as Senate president and as representative of the FSN [National Salvation Front] it would be unjust if I made such a statement to the press before making it known to the senators. So I combined the two. I asked both the press and the senators. Except that I didn't for a moment want it to be debated or discussed. I wanted to make a 20-30 minute statement and that's all. And in order to stress the fact that I wasn't doing it in my position as Senate president, I asked someone else, Mr. Mois, to chair the session. Perhaps it wasn't opportune for him to open the discussions. There was no question of having a discussion. I only wanted to make a statement to highlight my position.

[Dragotescu] Don't you think that all the consequences could have been averted if you had made this statement in a smaller circle? Within the FSN or the FSN group in Parliament?

[Birladeanu] There was no point speaking within the Front because the Front didn't even invite me to be consulted. I didn't even have an opportunity to see this

statute in draft form, or published in the press, as perhaps it should have been. Besides, I really wanted my statement to be very harsh and to be delivered with all the weight. I don't know what the result would have been if I had done it behind closed doors. I wanted to bring it into the light. In fact, I must say that as long as things are done backstage, we won't have a democracy. I was criticized for mixing party issues with Senate issues. But I believe, for the reasons I listed above, that that was not the case. If you recall, in January there was a declaration in which the government for the first time confused government and party functions. The government asked the prime minister, as national leader of the FSN, and the other ministers who were Front members, to appeal to the FSN Parliament members to withdraw their confidence from the chairmen of the two Chambers. So they mixed party and government issues. They were the first to do so.

[Dragotescu] Is there anything you want to say to Mr. Aurel Stoica?

[Birladeanu] Only what I told him before. I fear that his gesture to resign from the government was only a kneeling down rebellion. He was right to resign. The minister of justice did not respond at all at the time. But now he did respond to me. I remember the story with the lion who built a palace for himself and summoned three beasts to come and give their opinion. The first, the bear, said it smelled bad and was punished for slander; the second, the wolf, said it smelled good and was punished for flattery; the third, the fox, sniffed and said: I have a cold. I think that the minister had a cold and that's why he didn't react until now.

I didn't know Mr. Stoica before and I don't know him now. People who know him told me he was a sound man, as his gesture demonstrated. I am astonished that when the matter of my ousting came up, he, as executive chairman, didn't say: "Let's call him in and ask him. Maybe he has some arguments, maybe he can convince us or we can convince him." I'm astonished that he accepted the decision so easily.

[Dragotescu] Perhaps the statute does not envisage any obligation to summon the defendant before the organization.

[Birladeanu] If it doesn't, then that's even worse. It means that it does not recognize a person's right to self-defense. Not my right, because I had no reason to defend myself. It is a major deficiency for the statute.

[Dragotescu] Mr. Birladeanu, are you against the reform?

[Birladeanu] These accusations that are circulated are mere invectives, mere unproven accusations designed to create false problems. I don't think there is anyone in this country who is against the reform. I spoke about the reform on television already in January 1990, when many of those who today are champions of the reform didn't even know what a reform was. I think that my idea

of the reform cannot be interpreted to mean that I am against it. I am for a reform, but I think it should be done with as few human sacrifices as possible. The experience of the past shows that we cannot continue the way it was. The solution is only a reform. But how is this reform to be implemented, at what sacrifice, within what time frame, and by what concrete measures that's already a different matter. Nevertheless, when I said that the liberalization should take place later, I was accused of being against the reform.

[Dragotescu] How do you view the continuation of the reform from now on?

[Birladeanu] I find it very difficult to answer this question. First of all, I really don't have the information. I don't have the necessary data. I still don't know why this so-called price liberalization was implemented, because I think that in reality it was a price hike. What were the reasons? Was it a budget need? That's what we were always told: "We can no longer carry the subsidies we give." If so, then it is a budget need, not a reform strategy. If it is a matter of budget needs, then I think that there exist other possibilities that, if you ask me, have been concealed. For example, as I also said in Senate, revenues from sale of housing must come to 60 billion lei this year, of which the budget could effectively get 30 billion, the rest being loans. This kind of revenues are not shown in the budget. Another example: we say that we will sell stock and will go private. Where does the money from the sale of such stock go to? The budget. But nothing is envisaged. So there are budget sources that can put the problem of subsidies in a different light, rather than the bugaboo of "no, we can't carry it." I want to point out that France, too, has subsidized enterprises. This idea is not a noncapitalist idea or an idea alien to reform. I would implement the reform with greater care, not like a cavalry charge.

And here we have a new star rising, or rather climbing into the political firmament. Mr. Bogdan Baltazar. At one point Mr. Baltazar even gave me lessons. He said "With a bit of goodwill, Mr. Birladeanu may understand that in politics there is such a method as successive reiterations." And he even explained what this method consists of. You take a measure, you send some signals, the signals come back, you see what mistakes you made, you send signals again, and so forth. Do you know that this means in plain Romanian? You start the motor, fall in the hole in front of you, you reverse, fall in the hole behind you, and so on. This is called successive reiterations. I wouldn't allow myself to recommend to Mr. Baltazar to have a new suit made according to the method of successive reiterations, to first make the pants too short and the sleeves too long, and then bring it to the right dimensions by successive reiterations. Joke aside, I think that this method is cutting into the live flesh of the social body.

In my time, long covered in dust, it was said that governing means foreseeing. Whoever couldn't foresee

right, couldn't govern right. So now, instead of trying to foresee correctly, we make successive reiterations.

[Dragotescu] Do you think that people don't want to work or don't have anything to work at?

[Birladeanu] I think both. There are certain people, I won't say strata because that may be too much, who thought that if freedom came it would bring everything. They don't want to work, but I cannot accuse Romania's entire population of not wanting to work. People must be enabled to work. That is the task of the government. It is impossible that this country shouldn't be able to feed itself. And if it cannot feed itself, the fault lies with the rulers, not the country. We must devise forms of incentive and motivation for work. The best means is income. If the income is satisfactory, then the person will work for it, which also constitutes purchasing power and is also the best economic motor.

[Dragotescu] We're getting into a vicious circle. Incomes are established by enterprises according to each one's financial means. If the enterprise doesn't have work, it cannot offer incomes. What is to be done?

[Birladeanu] Each enterprise must be examined separately. You can't do what Mr. Severin said. If it has no means, it should go the way of unemployment. What are we doing, making millions of Romanians unemployed?

[Dragotescu] Mr. Catalin Zamfir said that people will be retrained and some will be sent to the country.

[Birladeanu] And what will they do in the country?

[Dragotescu] Work the land.

[Birladeanu] The worst thing in the economy is to think that one can solve problems with beautiful phrases, with words. How will these unemployed live? Each solution must be practical and pragmatic, not abstract. They are technicians, technocrats, I admire them, they have been greatly praised, but they must also be good managers. Technology can be merciless, too. You cannot ignore the human being. But if you do not, you are immediately viewed as a conservative, populist, bolshevik or neocommunist.

[Dragotescu] Do you think that the situation is out of control from an economic viewpoint?

[Birladeanu] It is out of control, but in some cases that was done deliberately. They said, "we are progressive we're not interested in this old economy." Not thinking what will this society live on if there is no production.

[Dragotescu] A government is the reflection of the parliament. Why doesn't Parliament replace the government?

[Birladeanu] You know the old saying, fools rejoice when the rulers change. A government shouldn't be replaced so easily. It should be helped and corrected. It is



turns out that there is no other way, then only should the issue of replacing it be raised

[Dragotescu] Nonetheless, you suggested a coalition government

[Birladeanu] I thought such a government was needed. I didn't suggest this kind of change as a punishment for the government

[Dragotescu] Are you aware of the people's mood?

[Birladeanu] Very little. I spend 10-12 hours a day in Senate. I know about the mood from what senators returning from districts tell me and from the press. Unfortunately, the press reflects it too little. But I know that it isn't very good

[Dragotescu] Do you fear that the masses may take to the streets?

[Birladeanu] Somebody from the trade unions said that if Parliament were supporting a change of government, they could bring hundreds of thousands of people out into the streets in support of such an idea. But that is not the method in a democratic country. Governments are changed not by the trade unions, but by the parliament. Of course, street pressure may exist and it serves as a good warning to the government, to parliament, and to all of us. I am not alarmed by those who gather in the square and shout "Down with Iliescu." But if people were coming out of plants and saying: we don't have bread or we don't have work to buy bread, then indeed the situation would be serious, and we would have no business being where we are. I said this months ago and I am still of the same opinion

[Dragotescu] So you are aware of the fact that people have a hard life

[Birladeanu] I'll give you a simple example. On Sundays I usually go with my wife and daughter to the Academiei Restaurant for dinner. A meal, without drinks, used to cost 300-400 lei. Now it costs 1,000 lei. I can't go anymore. So I, the president of the Senate, cannot go on Sunday with my family to a modest restaurant, because Academiei is not a luxury restaurant. So what does a man do who gets 4,000 lei a month? How can you not think about it? You can, if you don't want to be charged with populism. But I'll be a populist through and through and make the following suggestion. I admire people who appeal for sacrifices and harsh measures. Mr. Roman, too, said that a certain measure was harsh but it had to be taken, and Mr. Brucan said that sacrifices are made throughout the world. It's not difficult to appeal to others for sacrifices. So, half in joke and half in earnest I suggest this method. Let us all agree to receive the average salary in the economy. Nothing more. Then we'll see whether we are populists or not. If they accept the serious half of my proposal, I'm game

[Dragotescu] Mr. Birladeanu, you are one of the persons who under communism lived well economically

[Birladeanu] Yes, that's right

[Dragotescu] Do you regret communism?

[Birladeanu] No, no! You know why I don't regret it, although it was one of the ideals of my youth? Because experience showed me that it was a phase of disaster for the people. Alone the idea of the absence of freedom is already an indictment for communism. A system that can elevate and make leaders out of men like Stalin or Ceausescu can only be condemned by history

[Dragotescu] Do you think that in our country there is any danger of a return to communism?

[Birladeanu] Not in the foreseeable future. Naturally, leadership mistakes may lead to convulsions and certain movements, but I don't think that such mass convulsions will aim at more than improving the living conditions. I don't think that there will be demands to go back to communism. Certainly not

[Dragotescu] But is there any danger of a military dictatorship?

[Birladeanu] I don't think so. Strictly theoretically speaking, the more incapable the authorities will be to govern and to meet the needs of the masses, the closer will be the danger of a military dictatorship. But, once again, I'm talking theoretically. I don't see the Romanian Army intervening and supporting a dictatorship at the present

### Reintegration Into West Not 'Simple and Easy'

91BA0632B Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA  
in Romanian 18 Apr 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Octavian Paler: "The West and Us"]

[Text] We were not spared simplistic exaggerations in our views of the West. On the contrary, such exaggerations were a very handy temptation. Some of us demonized the West (I will not even mention all the nonsense about the capitalist "hell"), viewing it as a negative model of decadence and even of suicide by prosperity, while others among us idealized it.... In fact, we were both contradicted by the reality. It was obvious that all those who "fled" from East Europe were headed for the West. No one escapes to the East. The exiles travel along one way only, with the sun at their back. However, it is equally true that aside from virtues, the West has sins, too.... In spite of these obvious facts, two contradictory complexes continued to exist in our involved relations with the West. One is a superiority complex based on a sort of ridiculous pomposity ready to claim that we are more European than Europe, while the other is an inferiority complex, born and developed out of the historical disgraces that brought us into the situation of being poorer than those in the West, worse fed, worse dressed, and clumsier in using the facilities of modern technical civilization. Moreover, the lengthy abnormal life we had to endure seems to have made us lose the

habit of behaving normally. Yesterday we were too silent toward the West; today we are too vociferous. Yesterday we were disgusted with politics; today we are hysterical about politics. Yesterday we were afraid to say what we thought and consequently we were hampered in discussions; today we want to shout our truth and we are disconcerted to find that the West has other worries than to listen to us.

And then there are the bitterness and cloudy resentments that influenced our psyche, sometimes without us realizing it. Because however much the Romanians may be told that Yalta was a myth and that in reality no actual bargain was struck there, that everything that happened to us after World War II happened because of "Eastern" violence rather than "Western" concessions, somewhere in our subconscious the idea persists that we were abandoned, forsaken, and delivered. I suspect that in this wound, too, which never quite closed, festers that mad pride of isolation that once in a while impels some of us to thumb their noses at the West, as if the West had to do penance in order to win our trust. Anyway, my generation grew up with the conviction that at the end of the war the West selfishly took care of its own issues and ignored the unhappiness of the peoples in the East. After confronting Hitler, it lost the will to confront Stalin. It gave way in the face of Stalin's insolence and slyness, and retrenched into rhetoric and into the cold war that sealed our quarantine. We know what happened after that. Guided in its political combinations by the realistic (although not necessarily moral) principle that whoever was in power was a valid partner, because willy-nilly politics is conducted among states, the West in a way ended by becoming Ceausescu's accomplice and PR agent. Much to the Romanians' stupefaction, it did not hesitate to drive Ceausescu in royal carriages and to heap awards in great universities and academies on two semi-illiterates, simply because the West's East European strategy demanded that it flatter and fawn upon a dictator who showed signs of independence from Moscow. That this independence did not imply less servitude for Romania but more megalomania for a despot, was a matter of ethical, not diplomatic interest. Thus, for many years the West unfortunately supported our resignation and compromises, rather than our courage and hopes. And at times of bitterness, when we forgot that the West was our only point of reference and haven, we were ready to state, with unjust fury, that it was helping the dictatorship to organize hunger, cold, and fear, thus showing us that politics goes by interests rather than unhappiness, by calculations rather than humane feelings. We felt imprisoned in a harsh and alienating fate like in a grinder of nerves, lives, and hopes, and we did not possess the tranquility required for a balanced judgment.

We regained our confidence in December 1989, when the extraordinary solidarity of the West caused us to imagine that our reintegration into Europe was going to be simple and easy. That illusion was, alas, soon dispelled. Annoyed by the lies that turned the Romanian

revolution into a puzzle that to this day has not been solved and by increasingly obvious indications that Ceausescu's successors were clinging both to the past and to the power, the West tired of caring about Romania. In our turn, once we were out of its good graces, when we thought that all our hopes were natural, we changed. We tired of believing. Some of us are joining the wave of emigration; others are once again learning resignation. And we became divided. The authorities and their supporters now alternate antiwestern slogans with attempts to curry favor with the West. Those who dispute the authorities, accusing them of imposture and of pushing the country into a crisis of nightmarish proportions, are afraid that once again Western diplomacy may end up by pursuing only its own interests if it could not help establish democracy in Romania.

It is, of course, normal that the West should look after its interests and seek markets and areas of influence. Who today is a philanthropist? The tragedy of a nation may arouse compassion only for the short term. The West was sincerely happy when we got rid of Ceausescu, but the immediate enthusiasm was not capitalized upon and could not possibly last, especially since we ourselves did not really show that we knew how to use freedom in order to live the way we claim we want to live. It was not the West that voted for us on 20 May, that brought the miners to Bucharest, that unleashed the rampant corruption that prospers revoltingly at the expense of our squalor, that divided us, and that infected with lies a convalescence that has thus become a new form of disease. The West may at most now pretend not to see and not to understand the dangerous impasse we are in, or not to notice how the authorities are desperately seeking legitimacy abroad in order to cover up for illegitimacy at home and to stay in power despite the tremendous harm it has managed to do in less than one and a half years. The West may at most at some point stop making the—for us—vital distinction between giving economic aid to a country struggling against poverty (the kind of aid we all want) and extending political aid to a disputed regime (an aid that may stir up old and painful bitterness). But will the West risk being suspected of once again getting tired of us? I don't think so. I don't think that Western diplomacy may come to the conclusion that an area of influence is more valuable than what it stands to lose of the capital of traditional sympathy harbored by a good percentage of the population. And I don't think that the West may help not to restore, but to boycott democracy in Romania. In fact, it would be strange if we wanted a Western-type democracy, while the West, regardless of motives (let's say out of socialist solidarity in the case of France, or as a result of personal relations) urged us to be content with an "original" democracy.

#### FSN's Ion Stoica Fears Neocommunism

91BA0631B Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian  
16 Apr 91 p 2

[Interview with Ion Aurel Stoica by Irina Dimiu; place and date not given: "Everything Is Possible Here When It Comes To Interpretations"]

[Text] [Dimiu] How does it feel to be in politics at a time dominated by the absence of a political culture?

[Stoica] The answer should be lengthy, but I will mention only a few problems. We must recover our memory and calmly consider what happened in our country. One of the main problems—about which we unfortunately don't have enough time to reflect—concerns the system of values that existed prior to December 1989, because the moral fiber of the Romanian people was arranged in a certain manner, we have to rearrange this moral fiber, to organize and reshape a system of values characteristic of the civilized world, and to design the arc of this system of values.

Coming back to your question, I think that a rule, any rule, even one that is relatively bad, is better than no rule. But I refuse to believe that you are completely right and that the Romanian people have lost their common sense.

[Dimiu] At the National Convention of the National Salvation Front [FSN] some speakers were trying to apply the principle of the separation of powers in the state to party affairs?

[Stoica] I refuse to believe that those people had thought before speaking. Building a democracy is a difficult process and I think that we don't need to be ashamed to admit that in some areas we need to start with the abc. This requires that the political staff make great efforts to assimilate the values of modern democracy, but I also think that the mass media could also do something for the civic education of the electorate, who needs to acquire certain rules.

Consequently, we cannot be expected to separate a one-party government from the government party, because that's madness. Also at the convention someone expressed surprise that we stated in our statute that we wanted to win the elections. But in a pluralistic society this is the purpose of any political organization or alliance, to win elections...

[Dimiu] ...To implement its program?

[Stoica] Of course. But the important thing is that a pluralistic front of ideas does exist, that at the convention the majority current opted for a motion that constituted a first attempt to design a future for Romania. We don't claim that it is a perfect piece of work, but that it is perfectible. However, it is undoubtedly in accordance with the basic option of 22 December 1989 and it is a development of the program with which the Front went into the electoral campaign.

[Dimiu] Before the Convention the discussions were polarized on the social-democratic option. After the Convention, the debates focused on the statute. What has become of social-democracy?

[Stoica] The social-democratic option remains an essential issue and our *raison d'être*. In the near future we will announce the open structures capable of absorbing

anyone who echoes the ideals that the Front is endeavoring to serve. These "ideological workshops" will focus on organizing ideological curricula.

[Dimiu] Why social-democracy?

[Stoica] I believe that the transition from a totalitarian system—with which the FSN shares nothing in common—can only be carried out by a social-democratic political party that is endeavoring to achieve social emancipation through economic performance and whose main concern is the issue of social protection.

[Dimiu] But are funds available for social protection?

[Stoica] Social protection means redistribution. To redistribute something you must first have it. The budget of the central state administration is formed 90 percent out of sales and income taxes—essentially it is a matter of labor consumption. What we now have is a process of production decline. If there is something that we, the FSN, can reproach ourselves is that we have not yet achieved an economic recovery. But I think that in the very near future we will see a positive stagnation.

[Dimiu] What do you mean?

[Stoica] I am not concerned about the drop in the production volume as such. The way the Romanian industry was planned, certain adjustments must be made downward and certain branches must be phased out. We don't need to be scared by the issue of the drop in the production volume, if it is the consequence of a concept concerning the need to adjust certain branches of the national economy downward. But there are also branches that can entertain hopes of prosperity, like the branches that manufacture consumer goods.

The Front's primary obligation as a government party was to create a legislative framework in which economic factors can maneuver freely. To give you just one example, 48 percent of the population, who live in a rural environment, never had a better situation in the past 45 years than they did last year. Generally speaking I don't think that the Front has reason to be ashamed of itself.

[Dimiu] What can you tell me about the reform?

[Stoica] We are currently running into some concepts that act as an obstacle. Recently all kinds of brake-apppliers and demagogues who confuse economic analysis with propaganda have appeared both in the press and on television. They belong to the world of Caragiale [pre-war satirist] personages who wanted to make substantial improvements without changing anything. What some of these demagogues demand is against sane reason, because they want us to be both for the reform and against it. There is a danger that people who cannot bear the impact, namely the social cost of the reform, may begin to support those ideas. However, the costs of the reform will be all the lower if the transition is completed as quickly as possible. What is important for the government is to correctly assess how strong an impact of the

consequences of the transition to a market economy the society can bear. That's easy to say, but difficult to do. One valuable indication along this line is the recent IRSOP poll, which showed that with some variation of degree, 82 percent of the people questioned are in favor of the reform. The fact that 82 percent of the people agree with the idea of the reform is encouraging. Thus, the populism of some demagogues becomes an attack on the Romanians's wishes.

[Dimiu] At the convention you spoke about the possibility of early elections. Please expand.

[Stoica] I wouldn't want it to be understood that we want early elections. There is no justification for early elections because Parliament and the government have produced real records in some areas. However, from the FSN's viewpoint, a government limited to a short electoral cycle is an inhibited government. Some decisions or intentions risk being postponed in order to not affect the credibility of the political apparatus in government. The responsibility that the Front assumed for the transition to a market economy would perform much better if it were carried out within a normal electoral cycle. From another angle, judging from our experience as a provisional government and then as a legitimate government (until my resignation on 21 February), I think I can say that the sooner we have elections, the better it will be for the country.

[Dimiu] What is the position of the FSN on the ten deputies and three senators, including Mr. Birladeanu, who were separated from the Front?

[Stoica] One of my greatest postrevolutionary surprises was that, when it comes to opinions and their interpretation, in Romania everything is possible. The way these matters were interpreted serves to confirm my view. I cannot understand why anyone got the idea that we ousted anyone from the FSN. We learned that they no longer belonged to the FSN from public declarations, because obviously you cannot belong to a political group if you don't recognize its rules, principles, and goals or more precisely, its statute and program. We took only one decision: we will propose irrevocably withdrawing the party's support from their parliamentary activities. They will continue to be members of Parliament, but they will have nothing to do with our parliamentary groups. The problem is thus very simple and I don't see why it is being complicated and why the truth is being corrupted.

[Dimiu] What says now the executive president of a party that has trouble preserving its image as a "party of incorruptibles," who used to say that Providence helps only honest people?

[Stoica] I may be saying something trite but I think that currently the main threat is not neocommunism, but neocorruption, and on a different level, the neobarbarism of the demagogues. We have not investigated the scope of this phenomenon, but it certainly constitutes an extension of past practices against the backdrop of real

difficulties in meeting some of the people's needs. All of us wish that the per capita amount of happiness in Romania should be the biggest in the world, but this cannot come as manna from heaven, but as the outcome of an objective process. It is easy to say that we are turning in a vicious circle and that the Romanians don't work because they don't make money and they don't make money because they don't work. You don't have to be an economist to grasp that pay raises must lag behind labor productivity increases somewhat, which is not an invention of Marxist economics. We—meaning me in the first place—were wrong when we accused people of not working. I am convinced that the great majority of Romanians are genetically predisposed for work, but they must be given the legal, economic, and material conditions for labor consumption.

[Dimiu] Could the left be revived?

[Stoica] In the short term I think that the demagoguery of the extreme left may win over the electorate. In the medium and long term, however, I refuse to believe such a thing.

#### Editorial on the Mid-April Eger Conference

AU2305072991 Bucharest ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 14 May 91 p 1

[Editorial by Barna Bodo: "A Grotesque Drama (1)"]

[Text] What has been happening to we Hungarians in Romania for more than a year can be compared to a grotesque drama. It is incredible, infuriating, strange, impossible, incomprehensible, astonishing, and stunning—and this list of adjectives could be extended. Indeed, these adjectives qualify successive events, both separately and in relation to each other.

That is correct, my dear readers, we are talking about Eger. We are talking about that mid-April conference that was supposed to be scientific. After the conference, I immediately wrote a report in ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO, and unfortunately, I was proved only too right. I did not think that they would make this much of a fuss about the conference. Some 100 people got together, and a few of us were also there as observers. According to the program, there should have been one speaker from Transylvania, namely Imre Borbely from Temesvar [Timisoara], who was supposed to speak about the present and future of the Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania. However, in the end, he spoke about the role of Temesvar, and two or three other people at the conference spoke about the RMDSZ [Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania].

Thanks to television, we know that Laszlo Tokes was also present. He was there in his capacity as Reformed Bishop of Nagyvarad [Oradea], and the organizers had invited him to the ecumenical service after the conference. He was probably asked to step into the conference hall, and he probably decided to say a few words when he saw and heard what was going on. He made some



sensible comments (I base this on statements made by eyewitnesses and on the television report that was made about the conference). He calmed tempers and he placated those who had lost their self-control or who wanted to lose their self-control.

Why were tempers lost?

We are well aware of the way we live, and we are familiar with our rights and the extent of our misery, from every point of view, and particularly from the point of view of our cultural and mother-tongue institutions. Hardly anything has changed since the revolution. If we have taken a few steps forward, they have been in our intentions and terminology rather than in the area of our functioning mechanisms. In the meantime, if we have raised our voices for any reason, and quite rightly so, the nationalist agitating choir on the other side has shouted: "You want to break away! You want to ruin us! Drop dead!"

The Romanian authorities have been impatient and hurtful, and humiliating statements have been made by a certain vociferous medium.

Hungarians in the West and their organizations probably interpret this by saying that the revolution did not bring us enough. We agree, up to that point. However, some people continue this logic by saying that we are still incapable of controlling our own fate in a responsible way, that we are afraid and incapable of standing up for our own rights, that we perhaps do not even want to—in other words, that we need help. We need somebody to openly undertake roles on our behalf.

It is true that we need help. We need moral and spiritual support, as well as financial support, to enable our cultural institutions to function. However, from a political point of view, they can only talk about us as minors in need of a mouthpiece and a guardian if we sit down, eye to eye, for negotiations, only if they can prove that we have not even wanted to sit down and talk to anybody, only if we simply sweep everybody aside impatiently, and only if our fate becomes increasingly tragic in the meantime; only if we exclude others.

It is true that we are the ones who have to assume responsibility for our fate, and standing before our nation and history, we cannot transfer this responsibility to anybody else. However, we do not display the slightest sign of isolation or rejection, nor do we suffer from a superiority complex.

The RMDSZ was not officially invited to Eger. They said to a few people: "Look, there is something going on here, come along." It was not the association that was invited but a few chosen individuals. Consequently, we did not isolate ourselves on this occasion, either. It was others who chose to treat us as minors.

Are there motivations behind all of this?

In my opinion, yes. During the last 30 years, Hungarians in the West have literally lived to defeat the Communist regime that forced them into exile. That was the purpose

for which many people did a lot of hard and successful work. We owe them our thanks. In our complete isolation of that time, a helping hand came as a very welcome gesture. Now it is up to us to stand on our own two feet, together with their help.

However, if that is the case, then Hungarians in the West have lost their role. Perhaps they will even lose some financial support. There are a lot of people in the world, even in Hungary, who benefit from our predicament. The worse our situation, the greater their benefit. Indeed, that is how they can demonstrate the increasing importance of their role, and that is how they receive greater and greater financial support, because of the work that they do for us. At some point, they need to account for the money received, through a conference in Eger now and then. See! They are not passive, they are doing something.

But the way in which they do things! It was a good thing that Laszlo Tokes was present with his sensible comments. The problem is that here in Romania, any possible commotion around us is welcome; it is good if sentiments can be aroused. I will continue with this argument in the next part of my article.

I concluded my previous article by saying that certain forces outside of our country (who feel that it is their "vocation" to help us) benefit from our predicament. The worse our situation, the greater their benefit. That is how they can justify their importance, and that is how they receive support, in order to stand up for us and defend our interests.

Can this be real interest representation, if motivations are so absurd and internally contradictory?

Those people who stood up for us all of those years, when we really were unable to speak up in protest against our fate and difficulties, still play an active role today. They organize this and that for us. They feel that if we are too restrained for their liking, it is because we still have a legacy of fear from those days when very few people in this country were brave enough to speak up openly and risk their own lives. In other words, our restraint irritates some people and this leads to events like the one in Eger. Science gets mixed up with politics, much to everybody's detriment.

Once again, such events are very welcome in Romania. They are welcomed by certain forces (which we have called dark forces or post-Communist forces), forces that definitely do not want development in Romania, forces that try to stop development by painting enemy images, for example.

If the parliament holds a calm session, if arguments, thoughts, and explanations are voiced in a calm atmosphere that is free of bad tempers and superfluous sentiments, then this can only be an advantage for democracy. If we want democracy to gain ground, we

primarily need a calm exchange of views and arguments that are uninfluenced by aroused sentiments and bad tempers.

If nothing vaguely scandalous takes place over a period of time, then the authorities find something, or they create something.

They found something this time: the Eger conference.

Within the framework of its constitutional work, our national assembly is discussing the theses contained in Romania's national laws, passages that happen to be of vital importance to us, like the use of a person's mother-tongue when that person is dealing with the authorities, or regulations in the sphere of education. If the decisions made in relation to these issues are negative or detrimental for us, then it will be virtually impossible to introduce into the future text of our Constitution phrases that would legally guarantee a humane future for us. Many people in the parliament understand and are aware of this fact, so we can count on the support of considerable forces.

These forces had to be turned against us in some way.

This is where Eger came in handy. All they had to do was to inflate the balloon presented by the westerners, and there it was, floating above our heads like a bad omen. In this atmosphere, charged with nationalist tempers, we cannot even count on the votes of those who would normally enthusiastically agree that a community of 2 million people should have its own schools, at all levels.

The senate is also examining a law on our secret service. They have already handed back this law once for redrafting. As an emotional backdrop to the debate on this second draft, they are providing the great Hungarian danger: While some people "preach" democracy, others (shock! horror!) cut the country's unified body into pieces.

I suspect that there is a third excuse or reason behind this hysterical press campaign that has been launched against us since the Eger conference. Our newspaper recently published Andras Sugar's interview with Ion Iliescu. In this interview, as well as in the relevant television report, the correspondent showed Iliescu that the president sometimes failed to tell the truth. Television chairman Theodorescu did not seem too worried either. This in fact pleased many ethnic Romanian citizens; the authorities lost some of their prestige, and we benefited from the interview. This positive effect was neutralized when they worked the Eger conference to death. To be more precise, they tried to damage the credibility of our press by insinuating that clearly, in its articles on Eger, our press was not reporting on the same things that certain newspapers and programs are talking about now.

The tragic element in this grotesque drama is precisely the fact that both inside and outside this country, the interests that are coming to the forefront push us in the wrong direction. They try to make our situation as

negative as possible. Some vociferous forces within Romania try to subdue us, and other vociferous forces outside of our country try to stand up for the poor defenseless creatures that we are.

According to all this, we should not be given any role whatsoever in the present drama; not an acting part, and certainly not a directing part. Perhaps a walk-on part, who knows? It is as though we were only needed for the set.

We do not accept this. Our justification is simple: Others are playing their little tricks at our expense. A grotesque drama.

### Political Prospects of Ecology Parties Assessed

91BA0609A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA  
in Romanian 24 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by Petru Clej: "Unity Through Diversity"]

[Text] We are coming back today with the details about the recently held convention of Romanian Ecologists, which was preceded by the extraordinary conference of the largest ecology party in Romania, the Ecology Movement. The president of the party, Mr. Toma George Maiorescu, read a report in which he described the state of the movement at the present time. "Staying out of politics is nonsense," he said in reference to the attempt of some members of the movement to confine themselves to strictly scientific activities. President Maiorescu also said, "We are not on the right or left but in the center. We are a key party that will incline the balance in favor of reason." He added that the MER [Romanian Ecology Movement] is an opposition party but it is not opposed to some of its members' participation in government as independent figures. In reference to the fragmentation of the ecologists in Romania, the president of the MER painted a graphic picture to the effect that some of them prefer to be high priests in a church instead of participating in a council in a large cathedral.

Mr. Dolphi Drimer, rector of the University of Ecology, analyzed Romania's political and economic situations. We noted a detailed criticism of the present government, which Mr. Drimer accused of autocratic tendencies. He described the state of the economy as serious and accused the FSN [National Salvation Front] of inconsistency prejudicing all economic activity. He also reproached the government for destabilizing Romania by liberalizing prices, so that it is desirable for some to regret what had been, because "The disaster of communism is not over." Senator Marcian Bleahu gave a brief political account of European ecology, commenting that Romania is a country with the most members of parliament who are ecologists, numbering 22. Then delegates from the regional branches of MER took the floor. Many of the speakers criticized the movement's leadership very bitterly for its poor support of its branches. Some MER militants even opposed President Maiorescu, as well as the ecologists in Parliament, whom they accused of breaking with the voters who voted for

them on 20 May 1990. Mr. Mihai Balanescu, chairman of the Committee on Environmental Protection in the Assembly of Deputies, who was transferred recently from his function as president of the group of ecologists in Parliament, was another opposed figure. Mr. Balanescu counterattacked by accusing some MER deputies of serious irregularities and violations. Moreover, I had an occasion to discuss this with several persons in the corridors during an intermission, and they suggested that the movement had been infiltrated by persons representing some very obscure interests. But more on that on another occasion.

The convention of Romanian Ecologists was held after the MER's extraordinary conference. Besides the MER, it was attended by the following parties: the National Ecology Party, the Democratic Ecology Party, headquartered in Turda, the Humanist Ecology Party, headquartered in Arad, the Romanian Ecologist Youth, the Romanian Ecology Party, and the Romanian Ecology Federation. The convention opened in a highly charged atmosphere. Dan Decebal Gavrilescu, spokesman of the FER [Romanian Ecology Federation], read a declaration of the party headed by Prof. Alexandru Ionescu, former vice president and founding member of the MER. The declaration was couched in very aggressive language and contained attacks on the leaders of the movement (with anti-Semitic allusions to T.G. Maiorescu). Those attacked replied in their turn by accusing Prof. Al. Ionescu of collaborating with the Ceausescu regime. The success of the convention appeared compromised. Yet their minds were calmed and all political parties present managed to sign a political declaration except the FER and the PER [Romanian Ecology Party]. Besides Mr. Al. Ionescu's absence, the absence from the convention of Otto Weber, president of the PER, and that of Adrian Manolache, former vice president of the PER, were notable. The former is a deputy and the latter a senator. In the political declaration the ecology parties pledged to discuss with their branches the possibility of participating on joint lists of candidates in future elections of all Romanian ecologists.

Some brief conclusions in closing: The Romanian ecologists are not digesting their success well. After getting about 700,000 votes (5 percent of the votes cast) on 20 May, they are now credited by the public opinion polls with about 10 percent of the intentions to vote. But they are not succeeding in finding the way to unity, although it appears that at the present time they are the main beneficiaries along with the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] of the massive desertion of the FSN electorate. The dispute is a personal one of leaders who are not supporting each other. Among the gaining ecology leaders we would mention Marcian Bleahu, Dolphi Drimer and Calin Georgescu (president of the TER [Romanian Ecologist Youth]), and Otto Weber, Adrian Manolache, Mihai Balanescu, Toma George Maiorescu and Alexandru Ionescu as the visibly declining ones. The near future is liable to bring important clarifications in the political spectrum of Romanian ecology.

### **Ethnic Conflict Said To Obscure 'Real Problems'**

91BA0632A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA  
in Romanian 18 Apr 91 p 5

[Article by Sorin Popa: "Are There Ethnic Conflicts in Romania?"]

[Text] If we consider the fact that the victims of the unfortunate 1990 clash in Tirgu Mures were recently commemorated, then the answer is seemingly positive. Upon closer consideration, however, the situation becomes more complex, because appearances have misled and still manage to mislead a good portion of the public who are not well enough informed. Someone reproached our newspaper for having abandoned Transylvania into the arms of ROMANIA MARE and for not dealing enough with the ethnic problem. Could it be that Transylvania, or rather part of it, is itself playing into the hands of ROMANIA MARE by tackling the issue in a simplistic and superficial manner?

Every time a national-scale skulduggery is plotted, the ancestors' bones are dragged out of crypts, the banners of patriotism are waved, and their prestige is used to cover up vile maneuvers actually aimed at subjugating the nation. Over a reasonable attitude that rejects chauvinistic hysteria, the choice goes to nationalistic screams and goose-stepping defiant "patriotism" suitable for marching on 7 November and in the "Hymn to Romania" parade. Recently, ROMANIA LIBERA carried an appeal by the Prietenia [Friendship] Joint Romanian-Hungarian Association of Satu Mare that called for understanding between the two ethnic groups. Such a less sensational viewpoint (peace is not as spectacular as the image of war), must be shared by as many Romanians and Hungarians as possible and it is embraced by our daily without thereby betraying our national interests, on the contrary, in their devoted service.

Having said that, let us make a succinct analysis of the so-called ethnic conflict in our country. First we must observe that recently secessionism seems to have become and epidemic in East Europe. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, not to mention the Soviet empire, are showing a tendency to fall apart for various reasons which in fact can be reduced to one and the same. Each one of them is a federal state that has come out or is trying to come out of the communist trap. The main reason for the disintegration of the East European federal states is not the ethnic issue, but the varying speeds at which they are removing themselves from the bulwark of Marxism-Leninism. Those who feel that they can rid themselves of the communist slime faster, do not want to be burdened by a potential ballast and to carry on their backs those who move more laboriously. This is the case of the Baltic countries, Slovenia, and Croatia, where the conflict with the center is in fact a dispute between those who have been cured of totalitarianism and those who are still sprucing it up and covering it in make-up. Apparent ethnic conflicts are in fact maneuvers of the old structures that seek all kinds of pretexts to regain lost ground

by the force of arms. The presence of the Red Army where such conflicts are being staged is no coincidence, just like the attempts to decree a state of emergency in Yugoslavia.

Although Romania is not a federal state, considering the historical circumstances that brought about the presence of a large Hungarian minority in Transylvania, the dark forces of communist terror managed to regain lost ground by using the same pattern. The traditional electoral fief of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNT-cd], namely Transylvania, was snatched away by a base maneuver last year, when a new force emerged in the political arena. That was the "cultural" organization Vatra Romaneasca and its political wing, the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party], about whose composition reports appeared recently that reassured us: The Securitate finally has a legal party. By their chauvinistic rhetoric—excessively popularized by Romanian television—these organizations have managed to deflect the PNT electorate (a traditionally anti-communist party) toward the PUNR, which more often than not is allied with the FSN (National Salvation Front).

While Vatra's appetite for power seriously contributed to the escalation of conflicts, no less true is that the Hungarian minority's haste to regain some lost rights added fuel to the fire—especially their demands involving school segregation. From one viewpoint, this haste on the part of the Hungarians is justified, what was won in the first months of 1990 is still there; after that, the authorities awarded none of the freedoms it promised both to the minorities and to the Romanian majority. Moreover, the fact that the Hungarians wish to have freedoms in Romania means that they do not entertain secret thoughts of a possible annexation to Hungary, but that they seek to enjoy everything possible here. To keep chastising them, as is the case in Parliament, and to keep indicting even Hungarian babies for Horthy's crimes, does nothing but fan irredentism. Because otherwise, in normal conditions, no sane Romanian imagines that Hungary, with its multiple economic problems, is currently capable of sustaining a war of occupation. Or if, against all reason, it should try, there is no way it could succeed considering our military superiority, and keeping a Transylvania with a Romanian majority within the Hungarian borders falls into the realm of the impossible, because that would seriously disrupt the balance of forces. So the possibility of an open conflict does not exist anyway, although it would suit to a tee the traditional enemy of the East European peoples, namely the Soviet empire.

What do we, Romanians, bring to this endless dispute? Instead of a strong culture apt to raise the level of civilization of the majority population, we keep rattling the weapons of chauvinistic oratory; instead of asserting the native intelligence, we either choose cosmopolitanism or proceed to hunt down the intellectuals; instead of artistic and diplomatic refinement, we offer R. Vulpesco-type positivism. So why should not the

Western world see in us barbarians beating up the helpless minorities (as the Hungarian propaganda succeeded in persuading them), although the violence in Targu Mures was terrifying on both sides.

If all the problems that in fact have to do with eradicating the old structures are transferred into the sphere of ethnic conflicts, we should not be surprised at the frenzy of the next clashes. When the ouster of a corrupt Romanian manager transforms him into a national martyr, when the petty insolence of some Hungarian who jumped to the head of the line or parked in a Romanian's space leads to televised investigations of irredentism, when the incident of a Hungarian youth slapping a Romanian lout (yes, we do have our faults) for having insulted his girl becomes an example of persecution of poor Romanians, thanks to the "patriotic" assistance of the scandal press, then we can say that in fact the sense of proportion of this wretched people is being insulted. There is nothing admirable about those defenders of the old privileges who seek to demonstrate their love of fatherland by consistently cutting down any bridge of understanding between the two ethnic groups. They had enough time under the cobbler to know their ardent devotion to the nation by raising their voice against the crushing of our soul and traditions. Currently, they divert the attention from our real problems: the catastrophic process of reform, the Romanians on the other side of the Prut river, and the future of the entire nomenklatura through the back door. Consequently, we should allow the Hungarians to calm down their own hysterics and stop giving them opportunities to pose as victims. They should take care of their chauvinists and we should calm down ours. Raising the temperature of Romanian-Hungarian relations does not serve the interests of the two peoples who in fact share much in common (suffice it to recall the very numerous mixed families and the traditional common traditions that were considerably cooled in 1990 in our mutual loss). It is time that instead of a fist, we should offer a friendly hand.

#### Culture Ministry on Minorities, Jewish Community

91B400584 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romania  
6 Apr 91 p 3

[Interview with Victor Neumann, advisor for national minority problems to the Minister of Culture and Art of state, by Lucian Kanner, publisher of the weekly "Christianity Preaches Friendship and Harmony Love"]

[Text] [Kanner] The social upheavals through which we live, increasingly disclose the multi-ethnic and multi-ethnic situation that is our country. As a historian, how do you see this problem?

[Neumann] The topic you open is a very delicate one, it is difficult to bring forth certain conclusions.



who has studied it for a long time. I will just make a few remarks to be considered by your readers. First of all, I must say that the controversy arises (always has, see the exaltation of the romantics in the first half of the 19th century) from a dilettantism, which in Romania now manifests itself as the result of dark decades in our political, social, and institutional life. Romanian education has been denied access to sources, to biographies, and to a natural inquiry and understanding of the ethnic problem. Hence the inability to overcome so-called fundamentalisms, the impossibility to emerge from the ego and thus identify oneself in and through others. I will not generalize this phenomenon, especially since there are sufficient arguments to invalidate a categoric position. I often doubt my own statements! Living in the Banat, in Lugoj, and Timisoara, I have for many years not had an opportunity to observe that ethnicity could become a "problem." I continue to believe, in light of the multi-ethnic education of the Banat citizens of long ago (some of them survivors of Ceausescu's terror), that the consistent appeal to two or more cultures, the practice of several languages, are options open to those who seek to excel. I have rarely had occasion to encounter chauvinists or antisemites among those who spoke several languages, and who lived in parallel or simultaneously within their respective spiritualities.

Isolation leads to complexes, while an open mind fosters human solidarity, a concern for one's fellow man. Without altruism our lives are meaningless. As a believer in the ideal of cosmopolitanism, I perceive no other possibility for today's European nations, and specifically for those which have been recently freed from the dark ages of communism, than emancipation from the servitude of nationalism. Once educated, man no longer needs any ideology, nor does anyone have the right to think, let alone act, in its name. Everyone can be responsible for his own ideas and actions, everyone can distinguish between good and evil. What is needed now is sound schooling, which will first of all focus on education, and at higher levels will stimulate the mind in order to gain freedom of judgement.

When you are obsessed with a single survival formula (and nationalism is the last and weakest social bond professed by poor countries and ethnic groups which find themselves on the brink of disaster) you risk losing your credibility compared to someone who has an alternative, who can "reason things out." Pits on those who only see humanity through themselves, yet I do not believe that it is right to ignore them or to look down upon them. We must try to help them overcome their limitations. Radicalism serves no one, whatever side of the imaginary "fence" it originates from. In a word, the problem exists, even if it is a false one. That is exactly why we need not only discussions, articles, interviews, all of which are good, but especially a programmed training that does not lack scientific studies and books, as well as an appropriate organizational framework: schools, universities, academies. Theater and the church will probably also play a role in the multidimensional effort that

Romanian society will make in that direction. Politicians in turn, will no longer bet on ignorance but on the knowledge of the one who elects him. I hope that culture, together with the market economy, will naturally lead to a reduction in ethnic conflicts, to an acknowledgement and acceptance of diversities of all kind.

[Kanner] Some groups have recently encouraged a resurgence of antisemitism. Tell us briefly about the presence and development of the Jewish community in your country.

[Neumann] It is not possible to encompass, nor is it proper to dismiss in a few sentences the history of the Jewish minority in Romania. First of all, it is quasi-unknown to the great majority, and even the research conducted about it (interrupted or hidden for a long time) is still very weak. There are collections of documents from Iorga and Hurmuzaki which include testimony regarding the evolution of Jewish communities; others by Kara-Schvartz, Lazar Rosenbaum, M. A. Halevy, and more recently, the two volumes of sources published by Victor Eskenasy and Mihail Spielmann, contain specific references to Jews. Unfortunately, we still do not have a history formulated on modern scientific bases, using the methodology and concepts of contemporary universal historiography. The writings of the 19th century and of the first half of our century are far from reflecting the complex activity of the Jewish communities formed here during the past four and one-half centuries. Nevertheless, it is a starting point for those historians who can assume the responsibility of a long project, and who can withstand the rigors of a discipline which in the western world has long ago ceased to be the politician's humble servant. It is what I began to work on ten years ago, dusting off materials in archives and in public, private, and community libraries, adding my comments and interpretations which I hope will be well-balanced; they will form the topic of a book. Thus avoiding for the time being the usual circumstantial retrospectives, and I will ask you to agree that it serves no purpose to gloss over matters as long as we have not finalized an applied study in the field. At some point, after a few of its passages have appeared in print in a specialized journal, we could resume a discussion of the subject of that research.

[Kanner] Ill-intentioned people continue to stress the so-called incorrectness of the Jews throughout time. As a historian, what can you tell us about this?

[Neumann] There have always been, and always will be, such people. The question is whether they must be taken into consideration or not? You say it is an unspoken secret for those who understand it, that antisemitism results from a confusion in terms, the transfer of one's own lack of achievement on the Jews. And this is what, appearing in your newspaper, whose banner is "freedom, unity and democracy," I will take the liberty to say that the meaning of Christianity is indeed to correct the false image that some circles have supported with regard to Judaism: it has the obligation to erase from mankind's

memory the anathema that the Inquisition has cast upon the Jews, political and economic antisemitism stem from religious antisemitism. Christianity preaches universality and therefore love. Once emancipated from servitude, a true Christian is a great lover of mankind, and thus will make no distinction among ethnic groups, among those who belong to different cultures, religions, or traditions. As to race (a doubtful concept), it only exists if we descend to the animal kingdom.

The ill-attended make a great case of Jewish nonconformity; they fail to reflect on the Jewish opposition to the most repugnant groups of the Middle Ages, to the militarism of empires and kingdoms, or to the dictators of the modern world. Are the contributions of philosophers and rabbis, of doctors and diplomats, of traders and craftsmen, of bankers and technicians, to the evolution of Europe, of the world, of the mind, so unknown that the Jews can be constantly and powerfully discredited? It is clear that on history's spiral stairway, man will henceforth have to attempt the adventure of another civilization, and why not, maybe of a great civilization, in which the differences themselves will unify us.

[Kanner] Today, the Jewish community is the minority of minorities, with about 18,000 people. Do you believe that it can still contribute significantly to the country's development?

[Neumann] Why not? Their number is ultimately not important. I am beginning to feel that we have developed a reflex for numbers. A single doctor works on thousands of patients; a writer has hundreds or thousands of readers; an inventor discovers and promotes an original method (let us say) for computer utilization and thus lightens the work of millions of men. It is not the numbers of an ethnic group, independently of which one, that count, but rather what the individual produces by himself, exploiting his own resources, drawn from his own traditions, customs, teachings, always meshing with those of another (or many others). The more ethnic groups a society (country) will have, and the more they are cultivated, the faster major changes will occur. Could the American melting pot be just a coincidence?

### **Nastase on Relations With 'Neighbors'**

418407324 Bucharest LUMEA-AZI in Romanian  
16 May 1991, p. 2

[Interview with Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase by Mihaela Bruma and Ilie Olteanu, place and date not given. "From Good Neighborliness to the Bridge-Star Policy."]

[Text] [LUMEA-AZI] Minister, recently our press and public have been interested in Romania's relations with its neighbors, especially after the signing of the treaty with the Soviet Union. Please comment on the subject, also in the light of the fact that Hungary is promoting a security formula of its own from which Romania is excluded.

[Nastase] The first phase in Romania's foreign policy was to link up to West-European institutions, i.e., the European Council, the Common Market, NATO, and in a broader sense, the "Group of 24." That priority was strongly emphasized, especially in the second half of the past year and in the first month of this year. I would say that from that angle the situation is now on a certain track, and the specific projects and the actual functioning and unfolding of these already existing contacts are progressing in a gradual and natural process.

The second line of action was indeed to reshape, rethink, and redefine the relations with our neighbors. In that connection, too, the contacts made and visits by foreign ministers and even at higher levels have permitted a dialogue designed to restore a general legal framework to govern bilateral relations and at the same time to repeal a series of pledges which in a way were an extension of the Warsaw Pact philosophy that was being transposed to bilateral agreements. Thus, taking into account the changes that have occurred in our countries and in Europe in general, it obviously became necessary—and it continues to be necessary—to reshape and rebuild these relations by injecting them with new and modern values. The landmarks of this policy are easily discernible. The common denominator of an entire array of contacts—including our recent visitors, the Bulgarian foreign minister to begin with the closest, and the Turkish foreign minister; also my visits to Poland, Czechoslovakia (to attend a meeting in Prague, which also allowed me to meet with the Czechoslovak foreign minister), to Greece some time ago, and to Yugoslavia—was the attempt to rebuild our ties and suggest new formulas for our cooperation.

As for the second aspect included in your question, it is very clear that as soon as the ideological element—which was an artificial binder among the central and East European countries—disappeared, an extraordinarily rapid dynamics emerged in the wake of the redefinition of these countries' national interests, and given the vacuum of security and institutional policy in this area, each one of the countries in this part of Europe tried to create a certain climate of national security which at the same time could fit into the process of achieving a broader structure for the entire continent. For all these countries the first temptation was to negotiate and sign bilateral treaties. This can be noted not only in Romania's case, but in the case of the other countries in the region, and it is a process in which the Western countries are interested, too. Thus, a very complex network of bilateral treaties is being forged, which in a way is reminiscent of a style that prevailed in the period between the two world wars. That was and continues to be an attempt to deal at a basic level with the need for security that appeared and was felt when the Warsaw Pact was dismantled. However, a competition effort is emerging inside the region, generated by the desire to achieve the fastest possible domestic political and economic development. This competition gave birth to several formulas which at times are meant more for

internal consumption, while others are mostly aimed at gaining prestige. We must note this—this is an essential change that we often forget to mention. The disappearance of the ideological division and of the cold war in Europe means first of all smaller danger for the security of the members of the former communist bloc. In the final analysis, the essential objective is the economic development of these countries. Of course, security aspects or dangers continue to emerge, but they are beginning to lose of their military dominance and to shift to the domain of ecological dangers, internal strife, etc. Nevertheless, these matters are very far removed from the situation in Europe at the time of the cold war. This is still one of the positive elements that I want to stress. As for these countries, special emphasis is being placed on the economic factor and all the formulas of sub-regional organization are mostly aimed at strengthening cooperation and organizing cooperation among them in economic areas. However, because of the political and security vacuum, they do acquire some political and security connotations, too. Various ideas are being launched and tested probably because the European architecture and the plans for Europe's architecture are not yet very clear and there is still no very clear and accepted concept of a gradual progress from the basic level of bilateral treaties to a possible pan-European mechanism apt to ensure security for all the countries. There can be a trilateral or pentagonal level, or any geometrical figure, in threesomes or fivesomes, there are various such elements which, in my opinion, are absolutely natural at this time of searching. Some will fade, others will be eroded from the inside because of difficulties that may emerge, while yet others will probably be created precisely because of this need to get together, which is an objective need, not an ideological one. This seems perfectly clear to me. Of course, here we must understand that these aspects are connected to a period of transition and that they must not be allowed to seal the European regions into rigid structures, to lead to the reappearance of small blocs, or to replacing the iron curtain with other such division in East Europe. I think that this is one of the risks, but it can be averted through broader approaches, such as the type of meeting that will be organized in Berlin, the conference of CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers.

[LUMEA AZI] In connection with the treaty with the Soviet Union, we are the first East European country to sign such a document. Hungary, for example (but not only it), has some original ideas on this matter. Still on this subject, how do you see Romania's prospects for additional treaties?

[Nastase] I think we must proceed from the fact that each one of these treaties is an original treaty. Such a document cannot be used as a model or pattern. Each is designed to meet a specific geopolitical, economic, or other situation. What I think is very important is to accept the idea of and the need for new types of treaties that I have dubbed "post-Paris treaties," which should draw their inspiration from the philosophy of the Paris

Charter for a New Europe and from the values and principles featured in the CSCE documents. Along this line, we are currently negotiating treaties with many other countries: France and Italy, and we have communicated our plans for treaties with Germany, Poland, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Spain. So this is a process that will be continued. On the other hand, the other countries, too, have similar concerns. However, beyond the level of general philosophy, concept, and principles, each one of these treaties puts stress on certain specific aspects of cooperation and on activities of varying degrees of interest. In any case, I think that it is important for us to abandon the straitjacket of mutual assistance treaties such as we had with the Soviet Union and the other East European countries and to move on to treaties that are indeed treaties of cooperation and good neighborliness and can establish mutual relations in keeping with such standards.

[LUMEA AZI] How do you explain the fact that, despite the steps made in the process of democratization of the Romanian society and in the transition to a market economy—which are comparable to those of other former communist countries which, however, enjoy a different treatment—the United States has reservations to use a euphemism, about granting us the most-favored-nation clause?

[Nastase] I think that we must look at this issue with patience and wisdom. We must understand the fact that the United States had granted that clause to the Ceausescu regime and that is precisely why it is much more careful about developments in Romania; the United States is reticent precisely because it wants to see whether indeed Romanian politics are on the path of democratization. Secondly, the U.S. decisionmaking mechanism is much more subtle and complex. On a previous occasion I said that we unfortunately have neither the experience, the resources, or the infrastructure required to pursue very good contacts and very good public relations (last two words in English) in the United States. This is something we'll have to do. The third factor is, I think, that the wave of changes and perceptions concerning Romania reach the American public with some delay. It is very clear that there will always be some inertia in U.S. public opinion. Only after an effect is produced at this level, at the level of intermediary leaders, can there be an effect on the political decision-making level. On the other hand, it is quite clear that the American public is neither interested nor is it informed on a daily basis about what is happening in Romania; we must consistently work to keep up and to present the effects we wish to achieve to U.S. politicians and businessmen. This is still a laborious process. This is the reason for the inertia and for the relative delay concerning the clause in question, something that for us has also become a political symbol of our bilateral relations. In my opinion the process has already been put in motion. Prime Minister Petre Roman's visit to the United States was extremely useful for opening this process. I think that it is rather a question of time and I

don't think that we need to feel additional anxiety about it. Naturally, in the eyes of the U.S. Administration and Congress this process is very closely connected to the processes of democratization in Romania. If this process continues—and, like all those who wish to live in a free and more prosperous society, I hope it will—then, in my opinion, the clause, which as I said also has a political significance, will inevitably be granted again.

[LUMEA AZI] Until the CSCE security mechanisms become functional, some of the neighboring states have announced their intention to purchase modern weapons, some from the stockpiles of the former GDR and some from Western countries. What is the attitude of the Romanian Government in this situation?

[Nastase] In the matter of logistics and equipment, of course the central and East European armies are now and will for some time to come remain dependent on the equipment and types of weapons that were used in the Warsaw Pact. Some were manufactured in the countries in question, others, more sophisticated ones, were purchased by us or other countries from the Soviet Union. Evidently, after Germany's reunification, a considerable amount of weapons became available in the GDR. Precisely because of the structure and type of weapons existing in the East European countries, all of them want to purchase arms from GDR stocks. We are interested in it, too. I am no expert in military matters, but generally speaking it seems to me natural that we should also be interested in purchasing such weapons, which are of the same range and type used by the former Warsaw Pact.

[LUMEA AZI] What new elements are there in Romania's position toward the dismantling of CEMA and the prospects of establishing a new structure in the East European market?

[Nastase] The issue of the dismantling of CEMA and the establishment of new structures is rather complex. On the one hand, of course CEMA reflected the kind of ideological link I mentioned before; at the same time, it also created certain complementary economic relations. There have been two ideas that have not yet ripened into a definitive formula and no final resolution has emerged. On the one hand there is the desire to completely abandon all the relations forged within CEMA and not to accept the creation of a new economic organization in the region even on the basis of new principles and even in terms of a market economy. The rationale was that it was far more important to emphasize the flow of relations with the West and with Western economic organizations; also, the belief was that there was no point in having institutional-type relations with former CEMA member countries on other continents, which in a way constituted forced relations. On the other hand, it was also considered that for the transition period—until our economies become integrated in the Western economies or in Western organizations, and also in view of the fact that a certain specialization already exists among these countries and the fact that certain goods manufactured

in our countries are not yet competitive in Western markets but may still be purchased by countries in the area—there should be some form of organization, as a transitional formula, to permit us to continue exchanges until stockpiles are exhausted or until the structures of these complementary relations have been modernized. For the time being the issue is still open and in my opinion, the former kind of approach will prevail, in the sense that relations with the Western countries will be speeded up; as for the other, residual questions, it may be better that they be handled at bilateral, rather than multilateral level. However, once again, that is a personal view, since I am not an expert in economic matters.

[LUMEA AZI] Minister, please talk about the importance that Romania attaches to relations with non-European countries and about the new priorities that are emerging in our foreign policy from the viewpoint of geographical orientation.

[Nastase] Our foreign policy lines naturally tended to go toward Europe, because of geopolitical, geoeconomic, and axial reasons and because of internal and external needs. Naturally, we no longer can—and it would be absolutely fatal—to promote a global policy, a prestige policy devoid of substance, which would only mean a futile expenditure of resources and a pointless effort. Consequently, the policy that we are endeavoring to develop vis-a-vis other areas is aimed at carefully canvassing areas of outside of Europe and building a policy that I call a "bridge-star policy," whereby we seek to establish a bridgehead in other areas and then build a network around it as a base from which to pursue especially our economic interests in the surrounding interesting areas. This is what we have begun doing. We are also interested in the experience of other small countries that have achieved exceptional economic dynamics—I am referring to the small Asian dragons and to some Latin American countries. We have a rather sentimental and emotional image of Latin America. In reality, there are great differences and various models of economic growth. We are trying to learn these things and to adopt what can be useful to us.

[LUMEA AZI] After three consecutive trips to the Middle East by the U.S. secretary of state, a certain impasse has been reached about convening an international or regional peace conference. Does Romania, which has certain interests in the region, play any role in political and diplomatic efforts there?

[Nastase] The Middle East issues are once again in a diplomatic phase. After a period of actual diplomatic activities which lasted until 15 January, came one in which the diplomats idled, a period of military engagement. After the signing of the so-called "provisional armistice"—although in itself the idea of armistice means something provisional—diplomatic efforts began again. They are connected on the one hand to the central issue, namely Kuwait's situation and fulfilling the conditions imposed on Iraq for finalizing its relations with Kuwait.



On the other hand, elements emerged that had been viewed differently prior to the outbreak of the conflict. U.S. diplomacy, in particular Secretary of State James Baker, wishes to demonstrate American goodwill and that now that the international community has repelled the Iraqi aggression, it is also interested in attaining other objectives that were in one way or another, artificially or otherwise, connected with the crisis in the Persian Gulf. In my opinion, the process of preparations will continue for yet a good while. I don't think that we can see any crystallization at the moment. There will be many ideas, partnerships are being defined, and important geographical zones, including Western Europe, Japan, and Iran are defining their policy about their implication in the peace process. Many elements that can be carefully identified and clarified by negotiations are emerging. As for Romania, our priority was to obtain damages for the big losses we incurred because of the Persian Gulf crisis. We took steps in this respect at the United Nations, within Committee 661. Upon our initiative, a declaration was approved which verified the legitimacy of our claims and of other countries which suffered losses, and we hope to be able to secure reparations for those losses. Also, we are interested in participating in Kuwait's reconstruction efforts. We have taken many steps along this line. In fact, a high level visit to that region is being prepared precisely with the idea of marking our presence in an area where there is much room for construction and where the economic stakes are high. As for the peace process and the negotiations underway, for the time being they are taking place within a limited framework. It has not yet been our intention to participate in these efforts. Of course, whenever we will be in a position to and if we are needed—and asked—we will participate. For the time being we think that this is a period of clarification which requires primarily that key states take a position on settling the situation in the region.

[LUMEA AZI] Minister, recently the secretary general of the West European Union [WEU], Mr. Wim van Eckelen gave an interview for a Hungarian publication in which he mentioned the possibility of establishing Western rapid deployment forces—subordinated to both NATO and WEU—designed to intervene in East Europe in case of emergency. Could such a situation arise in Romania?

[Nastase] That interview was commented more than once. I think that the statement in question was represented in a rather exaggerated manner. In my opinion, such a scenario is pretty difficult to imagine. The implications would be extremely serious. Even with respect to the NATO and WEU concept, this idea implies that they would exceed their own geographic zone of action and it would create very great difficulties in preserving the philosophy and identity of those organizations as such. Both NATO and WEU are evidently endeavoring, as defensive alliances, to secure their own geographic space. There is no legal basis—in keeping with the CSCE documents—to justify such an intervention. More likely this is an idea circulated by foreign policy commentators. In my opinion, it was probably a balloon sent up to

test the reactions of the other countries. I see such an idea as very difficult to accept. What would such an intervention mean? It would create enormous complications for the countries in question. Look what happened in the Gulf, in Kuwait and Iraq, and the problem of the Kurds in northern Iraq. The political implications would be enormous and I don't see any basis for such an action nor any political sense in doing it.

[LUMEA AZI] Tomorrow you will go to London. Please tell us something in advance on the significance of this Romanian-British contact.

[Nastase] We are at a stage at which we must restore personal contacts at, I would say, political and diplomatic level. This has been done by zones and now we are endeavoring, as a first stage of diplomacy, to retrace our steps and to stop in each area in order to restore and reopen doors. Therefore, once again our objective is of a general nature, it is to form broad contacts at both governmental and political level, with businessmen and with the press, with a view to opening a window toward Romania and inviting the British public and political figures to look more carefully through this window and to see what is going on in our home. Later, of course, we will have to stick to clearer projects in our foreign actions. I am convinced that we are at a phase of general actions aimed at restoring contacts; at a later stage we will attempt practical projects specific to our foreign contacts.

[LUMEA AZI] In the past few days our public has been intensely commenting on the recent conference held in Eger on the topic of Transylvania and on alleged Romanian involvement in the events in Yugoslavia. What can our foreign minister tell us about that?

[Nastase] I think that, concerning the Eger conference, we must begin to handle government affairs and nongovernmental affairs in a very intelligent and differentiated manner. As far as a Foreign Ministry position is concerned, Ambassador Traian Chebeleu has already made a statement, in which he said that since it was a nongovernmental conference, we do not intend to discuss it. (Or, as Roman Law had it, "*de minimis non curat praetor*," a high official does not occupy himself with petty matters). Of course, the conference as such was interesting, but on another level, as a let's say indication, if there is such a thing—I don't want to make a ruling—of the existence of a broader strategy of which this conference may have been a part. That of course had to be brought up by political forces in our country, and it was. In my opinion, the reaction in itself was positive and natural; it was a reaction of national consciousness justified in its contents. But once again, I want to point out that at a governmental level I don't think we should take a position. This is a matter outside our realm of action. Evidently, however, such things do raise question marks for the Romanian Government, too.

Regarding Yugoslavia, as usual when the waters are muddied someone will try to fish in them. We're still not

sure who's launching them, but I think it is downright embarrassing, this game of reports which are then denied and which are aimed at creating the impression that Romania was implicated in one way or another in the events in Yugoslavia. That is not the case with us. Our position regarding Yugoslavia and the situation there is obvious: it was expressed at the high level contacts conducted. We highly value our relations of good neighborliness with Yugoslavia, for which there is a good tradition, and we are extremely interested in and very much hope that the situation returns to normal. On the other hand, if by some wild chance some Romanians were personally involved in the area, the government has expressed its readiness to immediately get in touch with the Yugoslav Government and have such persons severely punished.

[LUMEA AZI] Minister, it has been almost one year since you received the foreign affairs portfolio, so brilliantly held before the war by Nicolae Titulescu. What record can the current chief Romanian diplomat display and what does he think he has not achieved yet?

[Nastase] I think it's easier to tell you what I think I haven't yet achieved. We have still not managed to establish the best possible structure at the Foreign Ministry for rapidly receiving and reacting to foreign messages and for hammering out a long-term strategy in our foreign policy. From this viewpoint we are now trying to rethink our directions and our functional second string compartments; we will try to establish a Foreign Ministry Consultative Council incorporating representatives of the political parties represented in Parliament and international experts as a kind of "brain trust" (last two words in English) that can ensure coherent and efficient strategic foreign policy planning. We are also preparing a program of foreign policy strategic lines that will be discussed with representatives of the political parties—the first project will be soon presented—so that we can crystallize a concept centered on Romania's national interests.

I also think that we are not managing to speedily put together a new corps of diplomats. The situation is rather laborious, although in the past few months we hired almost 100 young people, under 35, the age average dropped significantly at the ministry, it is now around 40, 40 plus, although we sent almost 60 young people to studies and training, the situation is still at a stage of slow progress, a stage of acclimatization whose effects will probably benefit the next foreign minister, who will indeed enjoy a young, enthusiastic and competent corps. I can cite many other shortfalls. The fact that sometimes ministry staff are attacked in the press. There is a temptation to view every diplomat as a securist. There is a certain traditional envy that creates some difficulties. And then there is the salary problem. The salaries of the ministry personnel are very low. Recently—two-three weeks ago—almost 10 young and very valuable people left the Foreign Ministry because the pay is so low. With a current salary of 5,000-6,000 lei is very difficult to persuade anyone to stay at the

ministry, considering that they are requested to speak two foreign languages, dress elegantly, be presentable, be smart, have imagination, be cheerful and work both Saturdays and Sundays. It's very difficult. Which poses problems about bringing people on board. On the other hand, sometimes it is very difficult to say "no" for various reasons, to some of those who would like to join. They are probably personally frustrated. At the same time, they are of a certain age, 57-58 years old. Of course, rehiring them would constitute a reparation; they were fired from the ministry a few years ago after working here. Still, considering our limited resources and the need to restore the diplomatic corps, the Foreign Ministry cannot very well accept such a solution, painful as that may be for both the one who has to say "no" and the one who is told "no."

And then, how shall I say, because of the many daily problems it is impossible to distance oneself and think things through. I probably live mostly on what I accumulated at the Research Institute where I received my training, to which I am extremely grateful and from which I probably subconsciously received many ideas. But that cannot last very long. One needs to read continually, to learn new ideas, and to think with pencil in hand about the sentences one reads. That's something very difficult to do. What I can tell you is that my daily schedule begins at 10:30 and ends at 2:00, including Saturday and Sunday until 1:30. It is an effort, a contribution that I am trying to make responsibly but temporarily, of course, because I hope some day to return to a normal professional and family life, soon if possible. So together we must try to take a small step forward at this extremely difficult time, because I don't think that we can afford to keep going back to zero.

[LUMEA AZI] We want to wish you success and to thank you for this interview.

## YUGOSLAVIA

### Mesic Seen as SFRY Constitutional President

9/B4071A Zagreb UJESNIK in Serbian Croatian  
17 May 91 p. 1

[Article by HINA "Mesic Is President"]

[Text] In a statement for Croatian Radio on Thursday, Jadranko Crnic, president of the Constitutional Court of Croatia, said that the problem which the members of the SFRY Presidency (from Serbia and Montenegro) attempted to create by their unconstitutional procedure when they refused to declare that Stipe Mesic, at midnight, with the passing of 15 May 1991, became president of the SFRY Presidency, has in essence been resolved by the SFRY Constitution itself. That is, Crnic said, under the constitution itself Stipe Mesic was president of the SFRY Presidency from that moment regardless of whether anyone wanted it or wanted to declare it or acknowledge it. Crnic bases this assertion of his on the following:

### Under the SFRY Constitution

The provision of Article 327, Paragraph 1, of the SFRY Constitution prescribes that the SFRY Presidency elect a president and vice president from among the ranks of its members for a term of one year, and that, which I particularly emphasize, in the order established in the Operating Procedure of the SFRY Presidency.

Under Article 327, Paragraph 2, of the same constitution, the SFRY Presidency proclaims and announces the election of the president and vice president of the SFRY Presidency.

### The Operating Procedure

The prescriptions in the Operating Procedure of the SFRY Presidency (Articles 69 through 71) are also in conformity with those provisions. In Article 70, they define the order in which the function of president is performed by members of the Presidium. According to that sequence, after 15 May 1991, when the term of the president who is a member of the Presidency from the Socialist Republic of Serbia ceased, the member of the Presidium from the Republic of Croatia, that is, Stipe Mesic, is next. He was elected a member of the Presidium by the Croatian Assembly, which has sole jurisdiction, and that fact has been emphasized by the SFRY Assembly as well, after which he took up his position as a member of the SFRY Presidency.

So, respecting the provision of Article 327 of the SFRY Constitution and the Operating Procedure, Stipe Mesic, as the member of the Presidium from the Republic of Croatia, became the president of the SFRY Presidency under the constitution.

Every prescription and every provision of the constitution has a particular purpose, and so every expression contained in that provision can be interpreted solely in the context of that purpose.

### The Justification for the Word "Choose"

The expression "choose" in Article 327, Paragraph 1, of the SFRY Constitution and Article 69 of the Operating Procedure, then, is not meant in the sense of an election, because in no respect under these provisions of the constitution and Operating Procedure does it allow an election, nor would it be constitutional. The order is fixed in advance. All the members of the Presidency can do is to state whether 15 May 1991 has passed or is passing and whether in keeping with the constitution and the order in the Operating Procedure it has been stated who under the constitution itself has become president of the SFRY Presidency. There is no election whatsoever.

The act of proclamation and the act of announcement foreseen by Article 327, Paragraph 2, of the constitution are not constitutive in the least because there is no constitutional provision that states that the president takes office following the proclamation. On the contrary,

Article 71 of the Operating Procedure of the SFRY Presidency literally states that the president takes office on the day when the term of the member of the Presidency preceding him in that office expires. That is the essential difference from taking office in other positions, for example, as a member of the SFRY Presidency, because the member takes office as of the date of proclamation of the election in the SFRY Assembly. That act of proclamation has constitutive importance which does not exist in the taking of office of the president of the Presidency, nor does it stand in the way of the existence and performance of the duty of the president of Presidency.

### Unconstitutional Denial

All those who have denied in whatever form the announcement that Stipe Mesic is president of the SFRY Presidency have acted contrary to the constitution and also the resolutions of the SFRY Presidency, that is, the resolutions for which they themselves voted, but in so doing they did not prevent the occurrence of what occurs under the constitution itself—the constitutional origination of the tenure of Stipe Mesic as president of the SFRY Presidency. He is entitled to that office under the constitution itself, and denial of the declaration for voting (which in its content is not a vote) "against" has no constitutional effect whatsoever. Those who have acted contrary to the constitution and those who elected them to that position should reflect on their behavior, said Jadranko Crnic, president of the Croatian Constitutional Court, in his statement for Croatian Radio.

### Croatian Rejection of New Defense Law Explained

91BA0718B Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian  
17 May 91 p 3

[Article by Branko Podgornik "Sovereignty Over the Soldier's Boot"]

[Text] The most recent Law on Nationwide Defense signifies an imposition of further centralization and total control of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] in matters of nationwide defense all the way to the level of the opstina. That law is contrary to the constitution and laws of the Republic of Croatia, and it ought not to be accepted.

This is the first unofficial reaction which we heard on Thursday in circles of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Croatia concerning the Law on Nationwide Defense, which was adopted on Wednesday by the Federal Assembly in spite of the opposition of delegates from Croatia and Slovenia, most of whom left the session. This law seeks to take power away from civilian opstina and republic bodies of government and to place defense affairs in the jurisdiction of the JNA. The JNA would appoint the territorial defense commanders of the republics, not the republic, which signifies taking away from the republics even those small rights which they

have had up to now in the area of nationwide defense. In this law, Army circles are actually trying, we have learned unofficially, to legalize the taking away of weapons from territorial defense which the JNA did illegally in Croatia following the election last spring. The first reactions of Slovenian delegates confirm that the Law on Nationwide Defense, just like the earlier one on the military service obligation, is unacceptable to the Republic of Slovenia as well, because it truncates republic sovereignty instead of broadening it in keeping with the legitimate demands of the republics.

It can be added that the very procedure for adoption of the law confirms what was known even earlier: The delegates of the Federal Assembly are frequently a voting machine merely raising their hands for what has already been decided in the Federal Secretariat for National Defense and the National Defense Committee of the SFRY Assembly. It should not be forgotten that—according to our information—almost all of the 22 members of the Assembly Committee for National Defense are by profession JNA officers, although elected by republics. As VECER of Maribor wrote at one time, about 85 percent of the positions taken so far by the Army lobby in the committee were later accepted in the benches of the Assembly as an accomplished fact. Thus Yugoslavia, with its federal bodies, is one of the last countries in Europe in which defense ministers are not civilians, those they work with are not civilians, and, in addition, the military also has a decisive influence on adoption of assembly decisions in the interests of the top leadership of the JNA.

### Role, Importance of Croatian Special Forces

*JIB406084 Zagreb DANA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Apr 91 pp 14-15*

[Article by Fran Visnar: "You Weep for Ones Like That: Who Is the Man Who Led the Croatian Special Forces in Action in Liberating Plitvice"]

[Text] The practice firing range on Simun road, Zagreb, spring 1991. The young man in camouflage uniform rapidly removed the automatic rifle from his right shoulder, pumped it even while removing it, firmly clenched the slanted handle on the barrel with his left hand and sprayed a volley at several moveable silhouette targets that suddenly appeared before him. He fired all the rounds in 10 seconds, hurriedly threw the empty weapon aside, and skillfully removed the carbine from his left shoulder. He took a step forward, turned 180 degrees toward a sound from the right side, and fired a burst at the new target. All the cartridges had not yet fallen to the ground (the magazine was emptied in 2.14 seconds), and the bullets had torn the wood, cardboard, and paper to pieces.

A new threat unexpectedly appeared in the distance in the form of a target. The form of a masked terrorist with weapon aimed. First one, then another next to him. But, too late. Still quicker, in less than five seconds, that

young man—whose peers usually are bored the whole day listening to lectures in college or work mornings without a care in one of the Zagreb boutiques, and in the afternoons chat in cafes and talk about "how Croatia must be defended," only to forget everything in the evening in a noisy disco club—changed magazines, cocked the rifle and, with single shots in an unbroken series, drilled the targets, 25 steps away from the spot where he stood. He didn't even have time to think how good a capuccino would taste to him right now, since about 10 steps from him, somewhere on the left, an automatic practice device catapulted up a new target, a human silhouette of average height. He pulled a pistol from a holster on his left hip, inserted a clip in the barrel, grasped the weapon with two hands and fired, first two rounds, and then he fired twice more. The target was destroyed, with a rather large hole in the head and one equally large somewhat lower in the area of the heart.

But there was no pause at all. A noise from behind his back forced him to crouch, adroitly circle backwards, and then, while suddenly rising, quickly fire the remaining 11 rounds. He still held the smoking pistol between his palms, when two intimidating rubber dummies materialized near him. He was fearfully quick. With a characteristic hissing, he withdrew the knife from the sheath on his left hip and, with a well-trained move, stabbed the first dummy in the neck. He kicked it aside and threw his knife at the second (mobile) dummy, which had withdrawn several meters from him. Then, without warning, someone threw a heavy repeating shotgun to him from the edge of the firing range. He succeeded in catching it and fired three heavy shells at the cardboard automobile mockup that was just passing. He continued to pull the bolt back for a while, but the rifle no longer fired, since only three rounds had been put in the magazine.

Face and hands black from gunpowder, he then approached the dummy and there, where the heart should have been, a knife stuck out. The blade flashed for a moment before it was returned to the sheath, and the young man removed his visored cap. First he tenderly wiped the red-white squares of the insignia in the middle of the cap with his hand, and then the sweat from his forehead. Only slow movements of his chest and somewhat quicker breathing showed how much effort had been expended in such a short time in that simulated battle. The young man gazed with curiosity at the whole group that was approaching him. There was his commander, twice his age, with an equally strong neck, whose diameter indicated that the man was certainly a former judo performer with long athletic experience. In his hand he held a stopwatch, the hand of which was stopped at 55 seconds. He looked at the young man. Nothing could be read in his blue eyes; in a voice that neither praised nor criticized, he said, "Today 55, last time 57 seconds. Get it down to 50."

The youth didn't complain. He knew the rules well. To shoot down so many targets in less than one minute is a



lot for an ordinary man, but isn't enough for a member of the Croatian special forces....

The scenes on the firing range on which members of the operational units of special purpose of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, popularly known as "special forces," doubtlessly attract the curiosity in these difficult times both of the citizens and of the enemies of Croatia.

In just 11 months after the multiparty elections, the new governments have succeeded in recruiting significant manpower and, in a monthly cycle of 700 police recruits-volunteers, in bringing them through basic training, dressed in their already well-known uniforms (which, whether it appeals to everyone or not, have become one of the symbols of Croatian statehood) and, most importantly, in arming a whole two brigades of special forces, and in filling several more brigades of regular police with reservists.

This task, however expensive, and to many entirely unnecessary as well, has shown itself worthwhile during these very days, because if Croatia did not have so many armed policemen, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) would already have imposed "order and peace" throughout the homeland with tanks; this way, under the new circumstances, only actions of "separating" and demonstrations of armored might under the excuse "We are protecting you from us" were decided on. If the JNA had also begun shooting at the Croatian police, they would by no means have been easy prey like the German insurrectionists in East Berlin in 1953, the Hungarian insurrectionists in Budapest in 1956, and the Czech students in Prague in 1968. And why not? Because the Croatian side has a multitude of professionally interested and motivated people, imbued with an indescribable and unseen love of homeland, which quite resembles the American one in the war of independence. Moreover, there is also a great quantity of modern automatic weaponry.

Croatian special forces are youths from almost all parts of Croatia who are marked by enthusiasm, resourcefulness, agility. Many were already experienced from earlier on with weapons, while some are seeing them only now for the first time. And when, after all 14 to 17 weeks of fierce training, they undergo the baptism of fire on the training grounds rather well, pass all tests and enter the active service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, their further professional sharpening and training are just beginning. With all the regular obligations, at least another two years will certainly pass.

The brain [behind] the first real independent Croatian force in the new history is its commander, the man with a stopwatch, described on the training grounds in the introductory part of the text. Rumors have circulated that the commander of our special forces arrived as a Croatian emigrant from one of the overseas countries. One source has even confirmed that he brought a whole team of instructors with him—a group of hard professionals of Croatian descent who have served and been

trained in various security agencies and regular special units in Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Panama, and Costa Rica, as well as several West European countries.

Those claims had not even yet been checked when the "well-informed" public began to tell stories and poke around with the information that the main commander of the special Croatian units had nevertheless come from the local area, that he was a professor at the Department for Physical Education here in Zagreb, and that he is a known judo practitioner. The events at Plitvice interrupted further newspaper research in connection with his real identity.

And then this same, easily recognizable person, seen at Ministry of Internal Affairs training grounds, suddenly appeared on Croatian Television screens immediately after Plitvice was occupied. The commander of the Croatian special units began convincingly, certainly, and cold-bloodedly: "We came here, we performed the task assigned.... We will withdraw only when ordered to do so."

He did this in the manner of some British commanding officer from the elite Desert Rats division or even the first officer of the Second Parachute Regiment of the French Foreign Legion which recently rampaged in Zajevo. Having announced this promotion for the public, he then got into his jeep and drove to talks at the nearby staff of the JNA, looking without expression at the tank barrels en route aimed at his campsite.

Who is the first member of the special forces of Croatia? What's his name? What has he done in the past? At the moment this isn't important. Under wartime conditions, it is necessary to permit him to do his difficult and responsible job in peace. There will be an opportunity for answers in peaceful times.

But, nevertheless, some things cannot be suppressed. The commander of the Croatian special forces is a product of the new school of Croatian defense doctrine—to begin back at zero and create the kind of command cadre that will be in a position to form a first-class defense force from Croatian recruits, and everything for the protection of vital Croatian interests, regardless of which party is in power. "Croatia always and above all"—his command motto—creates in the men a force of will and a serenity of the soul, supporting their courage and devotion to the goal.

Only a charismatic personality, the type of leader who is self-assured, trained and capable of imposing himself on men with a force of importance can lead the Croatian special forces into the unknown. They will trust him without limitation and follow him without question. When he reprimands them, he must not be stern and rough at all. When he praises them, he must not expend too many words. And when he punishes them, it is sufficient if he only looks at them.

With him the rule prevails: "First your men, you last." That means to share all risks with his lads, to be hungry and thirsty like them, tired, wet and frozen just like them, happy and sad just like them. He strictly demands steely discipline from his men, but he subjects himself to it too. He doesn't cheat and he isn't two-faced; he loves the men, but he doesn't court their favor, nor does he buy his popularity and their obedience with cheap effects. Because the modern commander, if he must send his men to death, must show his own company, detachment, battalion, and brigade with his own example that he is also exposed to the risk himself.

This totally rejects the old officer's rule that many have so painfully and bitterly felt on their own skin throughout history: "It is important that you recognize your sergeant (first sergeant), but leave the troops to him."

The commander appraises his men, but they appraise him too. For each combat action, the commander must have a simple and clear plan (the British would say a "brilliantly clear plan"). And everyone who is a member of the special forces must believe in his task and in his victory, whether that is to occupy the police station in Pakrac, the post office at Plitvice or the fortifications in Knin, and after that to be proud of his contribution in the skirmishes.

As time passes, and the training fades away, those young men, who before that were almost children, will become strong and will love their commander; they will primarily respect his authority, and they will unconsciously imitate him as a standard as well. They will not forget him, because they do not have a reason to complain bitterly: "When we get the ammunition, I will kill that pig with the first shot in the back."

The member of the Croatian special forces fights and dies for what embodies his homeland—his commander. In this case for the "man with the stopwatch."

#### Goals of Muslim National Council of Sandzak

91BA0746A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian  
20 May 91 p 4

[Article by M. Antic and F. Hamidovic: "Muslim National Council of Sandzak Formed, Sandzak Out of Serbia"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] In the event of a breakup of Yugoslavia, Sandzak will declare its autonomy. The adopted declaration says that "all national interests" are in the Council's hands. The formation of Muslim detachments is ordered as a preventative step "due to the Chetnik threat." Dr. Sulejman Ugljanin is elected chairman of the Council by frenetic acclamation.

Novi Pazar—At yesterday's formal session of the Assembly of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] of Novi Pazar, a declaration by the Muslim National Council of Sandzak [MNVS] was adopted, announcing

the formation of the Muslim National Council, which will consist of representatives from all Sandzak opstinas, in the words of its chairman, Dr. Sulejman Ugljanin, who was elected yesterday.

Judging from the declaration, the Muslim National Council will assume power through the adoption of a special resolution or, as Ugljanin said at a press conference, "in the event of a direct threat to the Muslim nation in any part of Sanjak or the suspension of federal institutions, as well as in the event of the declaration of a state of emergency or of civil war." As soon as this council assumes power by means of a proclamation, in the words of Ugljanin, "all other governmental authorities shall be suspended, and Muslim deputies will resign from the republican assemblies" (meaning in Serbia and Montenegro).

The point of departure for the declaration by the Muslim National Council of Sandzak is "that Muslims have been physically annihilated for centuries" and that this annihilation of Muslims "is the goal of Greater Serbian ideology even today." The explanation accompanying the declaration includes the following as well. "Having learned from the past and faced now with the threat of physical annihilation, the decision was adopted on the formation of the council, which will comprise representatives of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action], other political parties and associations, religious communities, and nonparty figures."

Dr. Ugljanin also added the words "all Muslims."

The MNVS declaration contains the following provisions:

"The Muslim National Council of Sandzak will work on ensuring the civil and national equality and liberties of the citizens of Muslim nationality and of the Muslim nation in Sandzak. It assumes responsibility for all national interests. The only legitimate representative of the Muslim nation in Sandzak in the talks on the structure of Yugoslavia, as well as the only institution authorized to reach decisions on the status of Sandzak in a future Yugoslav community, is the MNVS. In the event of a breakup of Yugoslavia, the MNVS shall declare the autonomy of Sandzak, which was suspended on 29 March 1945."

#### Muslim Detachments

"In the event of a direct threat to the Muslim nation, the council shall form a defense staff that will take preventative action in order to defend the nation and avert bloodshed. The MNVS is mobilizing and organizing the Muslim nation in order to avert incursions by malicious, illegal armed groups and units. In the event of civil war, the MNVS will undertake the protection of all citizens in the territory of Sandzak. The supreme institution of the MNVS is the assembly... The Muslim National Council of Sandzak is the supreme institution of power of the autonomous region of Sandzak that will respect the

Muslim nation. The MNVS has an Executive Council, as well as a public security force.

"The MNVS has its own defense force, and as the institution in charge of national resistance, the Main Defense Staff of Sandzak, as well as the staffs on the city, local community, and village level. At the same time, it shall lead and command the national resistance, and orders that all healthy Muslims of age be deployed into defense groups-units and that they are obligated to respond to a call to duty. Those younger than 18 or older than 50 shall concern themselves with the evacuation of minors and the disabled."

The main task established is "to protect human lives and property, fundamental human rights and liberties, to establish normal conditions for life and work, and to protect the territorial integrity of Sandzak."

#### **We Do Not Know Our Rights**

The approximately 700 delegates present at the adoption of the declaration elected Dr. Sulejman Ugljanin chairman of the Muslim National Council by acclamation and frenetic applause, while the composition of the council was made public neither at the assembly nor at the press conference. In addition, the assembly was interwoven with national folklore.

The first to speak at the assembly was Dr. Sulejman Ugljanin, who said that it is sad that Muslims did not know until recently about all the rights that they enjoy. He blamed the Serbian-Montenegrin-communist-socialist coalition for the state of emergency in the country and the inability of its highest institutions to function, a coalition that publicly supports a federation but is itself destroying Yugoslavia.

This coalition, he continued, is unable to negotiate on the future of Yugoslavia, and especially not in the name of the Muslim nation. He accused this clique of promoting the Chetnik ideas of Vojislav Seselj, adding at the press conference that Muslims will not accept and do not accept a government that sentences Muslims on the basis of Article 61a of the Serbian Penal Code, while no one is calling Seselj to account based on that very article.

"We will not declare autonomy," Ugljanin continued. "It will be declared by the SFRY Presidency, the Federal Assembly, or someone else who will recognize the autonomy or secession of some part of Yugoslavia. In a confederal Yugoslavia, we will be the autonomous region of Sandzak."

According to him, there is no life for the Muslim nation in a Greater Serbia, or, as he called it, Serboslavia, adding, "We in the SDA will not let ourselves be defeated."

In a step which he confirmed at the press conference, Ugljanin ordered the delegates to immediately form

Muslim detachments in order to establish military coordination, so that everyone will know to which detachment he belongs and who his commanding officer is, "because we will not allow them to take us by surprise." He explained this as a need for "defense against the Chetniks," about whom he said that the danger does not come from Vojislav Seselj, who wears a cockade so that he can strut around having pictures taken of himself with it on; rather, "the danger comes from the Chetniks in our midst."

In response to a question by a BORBA reporter concerning who the Chetniks "in our midst" are, Ugljanin said that they are all the people in the current institutions of government who have disarmed the Muslim people, who have taken the army away from here, who have emptied the arms depots of the territorial defense force, while at the same time arming the Serbs with weapons. He added that the local SUP [Secretariat for Internal Affairs] has even armed a two-year-old Serbian child, illustrating his point by noting that for every 1,000 gun licenses issued to Serbs no more than 30 are issued to Muslims. He appealed to everyone present not to respond to the military call for mobilization, but rather to mobilize solely on the opstina level in order to defend their own freedom.

#### **No Need for a Referendum**

Asked by a reporter whether a referendum will be called concerning Sandzak autonomy and what the borders of this region are, Ugljanin responded that no referendum was organized when this area was stripped of its autonomy, nor will one be held now. As far as the borders are concerned, they are the ones taken away in 1945.

In response to a reporter's question, he said that the MNVS was formed by Jovic, Milosevic, and their ilk, who threatened the interests of the Muslim nation, and he justified his election as chairman of the Muslim National Council of Sanjak by pointing to his virtues in the struggle for the rights of Muslims.

At the assembly and at the press conference, Ugljanin said that "faced with the Chetnik threat," a large number of Muslims from Sandzak villages are taking refuge in the cities, that sentinels are being organized in the villages, and that it is not true that SDA patrols have gone from village to village persuading people to flee; on the contrary, they are there to calm them down.

At the assembly session, Stjepan Mesic was recognized as president of the SFRY Presidency out of respect for the constitution, while many nasty things were said about Seido Bajramovic.

Ugljanin also commented briefly on his visit to the United States, saying that there "they had higher standards than Izetbegovic and Tudjman."

Launched at the Assembly of the SDA of Novi Pazar, the collection of funds for the work of that party was

organized at the prompting of 20 private Novi Pazar artisans, who to this day have financed the SDA. A resolution was also adopted concerning the purchase of a car for the party chairman.

[Box, p 4]

#### **BORBA Employee Stopped**

Although BORBA's team of reporters was able to follow the proceedings of the Assembly of the SDA of Novi Pazar without a single hitch, before the press conference BORBA employee Ferid Hamidovic was barred from attending the press conference by several members of the party's top leadership.

Their explanation was that Hamidovic does not write to their liking, and after the intervention of another BORBA reporter, party chairman Dr. Sulejman Ugljanin responded that he was not allowed to attend the press conference for reasons of security. There was no further clarification, but based on what we are able to conclude, the issue here is that Ferid Hamidovic's writing does not please some leading figures in the SDA of Novi Pazar.

#### **Zagreb Professor on Defense System Changes**

91BA0730A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian  
20 May 91 pp 20-21

[Interview with Dr. Bozidar Javorovic, professor of political science, by Milos Sakic; place and date not given: "New Defense System: Yugoslav People's Army Will Have To Change Too"—first two paragraphs are VREME introduction]

[Text] Prof. Dr. Bozidar Javorovic is a professor in the Department of Political Science in Zagreb and a very competent figure in questions of defense. He talks to VREME about changes that have taken place, or that are about to take place, in the defense system and in its concept, about the function of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], about the National Guard in Croatia, about confederation....

Up to now, the operative army has been exclusively in the hands of the state, while the territorial army has been in the hands of self-management structures. Under the new conditions, there will be linkage between the territorial and operative components, meaning that local communities will no longer exercise authority over territorial defense (TO). The armed forces, Javorovic believes, will be centralized in the hands of the state.

[Sakic] How will the changes be reflected in relations between the republics and the federal state?

[Javorovic] Because the republics are being constituted as sovereign states, they are also organizing their own defense system and their own armed forces. Take, for example, the constitutions of Croatia and Serbia, which clearly proceed from the assumption that each of them has its own armed forces, as well as a complete system of defense and protection.

If republics join together in some form of community, regardless of what kind, they will certainly have common defense interests. This means that they would enter into joint defense, and thus in this regard the republics would transfer part of the authority to the alliance, confederation, or federation. The ways in which the armed forces within the republics and the joint armed forces are organized could be different. This is a matter for negotiation. One solution is for territorial defense to be republican, while the operative army is a joint structure. A second solution is for the republics to have both territorial and operative troops, and for part of the operative forces to be shared. A third solution is for the joint armed forces to be an operative army that is deployed throughout the republics but that comes together when necessary, which would allow soldiers to fulfill military service in their home republic and speak their own language while in the armed forces, thus giving these armed forces a national, or rather republican character, while at the same time they would belong to a joint defense system.

[Sakic] What sort of position should be assigned to the JNA in this context, and how should it function?

[Javorovic] The JNA, as an operative army, must be gradually modified in accordance with the prevailing changes. It must be completely freed of all political, ideological, and partisan alignments. The abolition of party organizations within the JNA is meaningless if at the same time a new party is formed through which the military acts. That simply sidesteps the issue. An army must be first and foremost the defender of a country's fundamental values: freedom, constitutional order, and sovereignty.

[Sakic] Is the JNA capable of carrying out these changes in the short term, given the fact that it was one of the main pillars of support for the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia], and aren't these roots too deep for rapid depoliticization?

[Javorovic] It is true that this process is most painful in the armed forces, but it must take place because in a democratic society the JNA cannot be a political factor. It can defend the constitutional order, but it cannot immutably cement it down; rather, it should defend a constitutional order that is established by legal social forces, meaning the legal organs of power. No order is immutable. It will undergo those transformations demanded of it by the republics. The JNA has long been able to do this, in such a way that the territorial organization of the armed forces is organized according to republics, instead of on strategic foundations. In that case, we would not have the first, third, and fifth army districts, but rather each republic would be its own district.

[Sakic] This means that a JNA organized in this way would not be able to intervene in the event of armed rebellions in individual republics?



[Javorovic] In a democratic society, it cannot interfere with the internal affairs of the republics. It must concern itself with defending the country against external aggression, and internal intervention is possible only at the request of the legal organs of power in the respective republic, when the police forces are unable to handle outbreaks of terrorism, separatism, etc.

[Sakic] Don't you think that in the case of the events in Knin the JNA wants to play the role of a sort of buffer zone in order to avert civil war?

[Javorovic] The JNA cannot regard itself as belonging to anyone; it is an armed force that can take action only under orders from civilian authorities, as stipulated by the constitution. No one in the armed forces has the authority to set those armed forces in motion, unless so ordered by competent organs, which in our case are the assembly and the Presidency, and this by consensus, not by a majority vote.

[Sakic] In addition to its classical police force (the SJS [Public Security Station]) and its service for defending the constitutional order (the former SDB [State Security Service]), has Croatia also gotten a national armed force, and can the National Guard be regarded as a national army?

[Javorovic] No, yes...actually no. Here we are talking about a reorganization of the police, who are under the authority of each republic. A differentiation is under way here. The regular police functions are being separated from the operative duties. The former militia forces (specialists) will in the future be organized in a different manner, both functionally and territorially. The National Guard is similar to the gendarmerie in France and the carabinieri in Italy. Their purpose is to fight terrorism, to protect important facilities during sporting events and on other occasions.... It does not constitute an army, but rather a specific operative force that can also be used as an armed force. In addition, it is normal that these forces be used in the defense of Croatia (they are not a component of the armed forces, but rather are under the MUP [Ministry for Internal Affairs]), just as if Serbia used its militia forces to defend its borders.

[Sakic] In their concept, Slovenia and Croatia, the advocates of a confederative arrangement, have included a concept for the functioning of the defense system in such a community. What are the basic ideas as far as the organization of the armed forces is concerned?

[Javorovic] As sovereign states, each member of the confederation would independently organize its own system of defense and its own armed forces. There could be an agency on the confederation level that would be directly concerned with the defense system and the armed forces. This could be a council consisting of the defense ministers of all the members of the community, or a special council (council of defense or council of national defense) formulated according to the principle of parity, or made up of representatives of all members of the confederation. Joint armed forces are implicitly assumed here as well. These forces would be organized as

an operative army; anything else is out of the question. It would have three components, like any modern operative military force (air force, navy, and ground forces). The question of the supreme command would also have to be resolved. One solution would be that there be a supreme commander, or that the post be empty during peacetime but that the chairman of the council of ministers occupy that post during time of war.

The defense concept would take as its starting point Article 51 of the UN Charter, about every state's right to defense. Republics (states) must agree in writing that they will not use their forces for internal conflicts and for settling scores. In the event of attack by an outside power, the republican armed forces would be involved in defense, in addition to the confederation's joint forces.

[Box, p 21]

#### Ambiguous Interpretation

[Sakic] What do you have to say about the latest resolution by the SFRY Presidency in connection with resolving the crisis in Croatia? Can the long-awaited consensus be regarded as a move away from the deadlock?

[Javorovic] I think that it is good that the Presidency decided on a political resolution to the crisis situation. However, despite this unusually well-defined position, it has still not gone far enough in many matters. Thus, some things can be interpreted ambiguously both by the civilian authorities in Croatia and by the JNA. This could complicate finding a solution to the problem. First, the Presidency definitely needed to state that Serbs in Croatia can be represented only by their delegates to the Croatian Assembly, that the Croatian government can negotiate only with them, and that neither Babic nor the Serbian National Council can fill this role.

As far as the Army is concerned, it cannot act as an arbitrator anywhere, including Croatia. What it has to do in Croatia is not to arbitrate in political processes, but rather to assist the legal organs of power in reestablishing the constitutionally legal order in those regions that are under the influence of separatists outside the jurisdiction of the assembly and the government.

The Presidency has also not gone far enough with respect to disarmament. It should have said that all formations that do not recognize the legal authorities must lay down their arms, primarily Martić's people and other groups in the so-called SAO [Serbian Autonomous Region of] Krajina. The reserve structures can be demobilized only in places where there are no focal points of the crisis, but not in areas where sabotage is carried out every day. As far as disarming the population is concerned, that is not only a Croatian problem, but also a Yugoslav one. However, it appears that no one has the courage to undertake this. The situation in this country is such that citizens are simply unsafe, so that they will not turn in their weapons until the political climate can guarantee their safety.

**CZECHOSLOVAKIA****Army Officers To Train in U.S., France**

*LD2205211291 Prague CTK in English 1325 GMT  
22 May 91*

[Text] Prague May 22 (CTK)—A delegation of the National War Academy in Washington has delivered during its visit to Czechoslovakia an offer of training in the U.S. for high officers of the Czechoslovak Army, journalists were told at a regular briefing of the Czechoslovak Defense Ministry here today. The offer includes

professional education and training of officers and civilians within a U.S. defense program. At present, the selection of suitable applicants is under way. They will leave for the U.S. during this year, for eight-month stays on an average. The ministry says the Czechoslovak Army cooperates in education also with France, but only 50 percent of the capacity offered by France is being used because of the language barrier. At today's briefing the new chief of ministerial inspection, Colonel Rudolf Silhan (born 1928), and the new Defense Ministry press spokeswoman, Vlasta Hlusickova, were introduced to journalists.

## POLAND

### China Expected To Set Up 30 Joint Ventures

LD2105170891 Warsaw PAP in English 1115 GMT  
21 May 91

[Text] Warsaw, May 21—Poland and China are expected in the near future to sign agreements on the formation of thirty joint ventures, a representative of the Chinese International Investment Corporation Zhang Hongsheng said here on May 20.

The two countries are looking for new forms of economic cooperation after their turnover has gone down by 40 percent as a result of the introduction of cash settlements instead of clearing ones last year.

The Polish National Economic Chamber, together with Polish commercial representatives in Beijing, has prepared a *Guide to Chinese Market* whose authors suggest possible forms of cooperation between Polish and Chinese partners.

### Reprivatization Efforts, Draft Laws Reviewed

91EP0460A Warsaw SPOTKANIE in Polish No 11,  
27 Mar 91 p 7

[Article by Anna Ostyk: "Causing a Stir in Reprivatization"]

[Text] It looks as if another nationwide discussion will begin, this time about reprivatization. Emotions are running high because the number of people who have been wronged by the communist government is not small. In addition, a great deal was said during the presidential elections campaign on the need to redress the wrongs. And, although the talk was in the form of slogans and catchphrases, it was enough to awaken hopes and strengthen the claims attitudes.

Right now there are two drafts which pertain to the principles of reprivatization. One, the government draft, prepared by the office of Minister Lewandowski, and the second, which originated in the Office of the President. They differ from each other primarily as to the scope of redress.

The government draft provides that reprivatization should cover only those cases in which a law in effect at that time, i.e., after 1944, was violated; that it should apply to Polish citizens now living in Poland; and that the return of property may be in kind (rarely), or in the form of capital certificates, identical to privatization certificates (more often). If reprivatization were to be accomplished in this form, its costs would be in the hundreds of billions of zlotys. All of society would have to bear these costs. This is one more example of the collective responsibility of everyone for the wasteful exploitation by the group governing the Polish People's Republic.

The second draft, coming from the Office of the President, is more generous. It expands the number of persons entitled to redress as well as the range of wrongs requiring redress, e.g., the return of forests. It also provides for return of property mainly in kind. Andrzej Zawislak, minister of industry, is of the opinion that reprivatization accomplished that way would cost not billions, but trillions, of zlotys.

It is expected that the government will accept its own, more economical variant, which will then go to the Sejm. This matter is very urgent because reprivatization must precede privatization. First we have to determine what belongs to whom, in order that we may later be able to seek new owners for the remaining state property. Whether Lech Walesa, represented by Jerzy Grohman, chairman of the Polish Industrialists Association, accepts the government's position, time will soon tell. But even if he does, again a stir has been caused.

To the end of February, the following have demanded the return of property: 548 owners of mills, 338 owners of farm real estate, 228 owners of pharmacies, 149 owners of workshops and small firms, 121 owners of plots and [accompanying] buildings, 84 owners of brick factories, 82 owners of large factories, and seven owners of river barges.

### Delay in Granting Subsidies to Farmers Noted

91EP0460B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 22 Apr 91 p 1

[Article by Pawel Jablonski: "The Farmers Are Waiting"]

[Text] In the budget law for the current year the Sejm has designated over 4.3 trillion zlotys for agriculture. Of this sum, only 1 trillion has reached the farmers in the form of supplements to preferential credits intended for the purchase of fertilizers and pesticides.

What is interesting is that this credit, which has been already been functioning for a month and a half, is actually in effect without any detailed rules having been issued, because the minister's decree in this matter is still in the draft phase. This document should define the rules for granting assistance from the State Treasury for the restructuring and modernization of agriculture and its community and for supplying water to the countryside.

The draft order was prepared at the beginning of March. The announcement by the Council of Ministers on the scope and principles of granting assistance to creditors in making payments of part of the interest owed the banks is also being delayed. This decree contains information very important to all farmers on what kind of reductions in the interest rate on credit they can expect. Meanwhile, another month has passed since the budget law was passed and none of the applicable decrees have been issued. Whole pilgrimages of farmers interested in credits have passed through the Ministry of Agriculture during this period. This also pertains to funds for the

water supply system. The Land Sales Department says that representatives of approximately 800 committees have applied personally or by letter for subsidies for the construction of water supply systems.

Why decrees which are so badly needed have not yet been issued, we really do not know, but it appears from numerous statements that they have become stalled in the mysterious triangle extending between the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Bank of Poland, and the Ministry of Finance. There are those who link this entire delay to the disastrous condition of the State Treasury. If the latter rumor were to be true, then it can be expected that a long time will elapse before the money so badly needed by agriculture will reach it.

RZECZPOSPOLITA already printed, in April, the preliminary draft of the conditions and goals for preferential credits to agriculture and the food economy in 1991. Therefore, I will relate here only what has changed since then. First of all, credit for procurement of farm crops from this year's harvest will not be given. The interest rate on preferential credits for agriculture is to be equal to half of the interest on refinancing credit, but not lower than 20 percent. However, credits designated for the purchase of wheelchairs and automobiles for disabled persons and their caretakers will carry an interest rate of 50 percent of the refinancing credit. Fifty million zlotys has been allocated for this purpose. This information comes out of the last version of the Council of Ministers decree.

Much larger changes were made in the rules for granting assistance out of the funds designated for the development of agriculture. The budget law provides that over 228 billion zlotys should be spent to supply the countryside with water. Yet, according to the information assembled in the ministry, 1.2 trillion zlotys is still needed just for investments which have already been started, while 0.8 trillion are needed for investments which should be initiated this year. In this year's prices, this amounts to 3.2-3.5 trillion zlotys. That is why the plan is to increase the sum approved by the Sejm to 700 billion zlotys. Despite the fact that all of this is still in the draft phase, it has already been determined what sums, from this total amount, the individual voivodships will receive in the form of subsidies.

Also in the form of subsidies, over 228 billion zlotys is supposed to go to agriculture. It is designated for assistance in modernizing the technology of production and applying it to agriculture and to the processing of farm crops. It appears, therefore, that subsidies as a form of assistance for agriculture continue to exist.

#### **Economic Consultative Meeting 'Fruitful'**

LD2105201591 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network  
in Polish 1700 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] In Warsaw a news conference has been held to sum up the extraordinary economic consultative meeting organized by the president of the republic's

advisory committee. The conference was chaired by Wojciech Wlodarczyk, a minister in the president's chancellery.

[Begin Wlodarczyk recording] The results of this meeting, which has already been held, which we are now testifying to, are I think very interesting and fruitful. What was hitherto often treated, particularly by the press, as a certain kind of slogan, that the government's policy had absolutely no alternative, and that alternative—a word treated as an absolute, categorical, and ruthless sticking to only one line—has probably finally been undermined [sentence as heard]. The basic principles of Balcerowicz's policy have never been refuted, above all those concerning inflation and the means of fighting it. However, there are many various ways of corrections, necessary corrections, and that moderate group of attitudes demonstrated an awful lot of precisely such [word indistinct] of action, which ought to and should be used. [end recording]

## **ROMANIA**

### **Stolojan on Restoring Supply-Demand Balance**

91BA0630A Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER  
in Romanian 25 Apr 91 p 2

[Interview with Finance Minister Theodor Stolojan by Nicolae Iliescu; place and date not given: "I Am First a Professional and Then a Politician"]

[Text] [Iliescu] Considering the changes made and the prices and salaries, how do you see the development of small personal savings?

[Stolojan] This is one of the sensitive problems of the transition, namely restoring the balance between supply and demand, actually between money demand and production supply. One way of achieving this is through price liberalization; savings will not be protected, except in the case of enterprises, and interest rates have also risen very steeply. The interest paid must be charged to those who use the resources, but raising interest rates even more would make credit more expensive.

[Iliescu] Do you think that reducing the purchasing power of the Romanian citizen will provide an incentive for investing in production?

[Stolojan] The purchasing power must be viewed in relation to the supply of commodities and services, because the citizen's purchasing power is given by, let's say, the monetary expression of his disposable cash. This view is insufficient, because the problem is the value of the public's disposable money. What good is it that the public is holding hundreds of billions of lei if the society cannot supply goods and services to meet consumer demands. All we have in this case are two elements: increase production, or maneuver the prices that are apt to restore the balance. This situation exists throughout the world, everyone has to deal with it; some have



stabilized savings and a certain ratio between demand and supply in the course of time, and these relationships are closely watched lest they deteriorate. Look how concerned the developed countries are not to allow a certain inflation rate to develop. Why? Because they have, over time, established this kind of balance and inflation would undoubtedly disrupt it. In our country, unfortunately, the problem is the opposite; you realize that we have extremely large accumulated imbalances in the relationship between demand and supply, and we must shrink these imbalances over a long period of time and maintain a certain price control, something that is not specific to the transition in the Romanian economy. We are requested to eliminate the imbalance overnight, otherwise we cannot lay a healthy foundation for economic development. What you were saying about investment incentive—what investment can you encourage when the investor clearly knows that he will produce meat, but that there is a ceiling on the price at which he can deliver this meat, which does not accommodate his interests.

[Iliescu] Do you think that this "overnight" recovery can be carried out democratically, or will it be necessary to take some authoritative measures, at least for the present?

[Stolojan] The public refuses to allow prices to restore the balance between demand and supply. It accepts interminable waiting lists and having the police keep order at vehicle sales, so even in the case of cars, which are not commodities of primary necessity, people will allow the price to be dictated by demand and supply. Of course, we could say that Pitesti is the only manufacturer and will sell cars for 1 million lei apiece. They will sell one or two for 1 million, but then there won't be anyone left who can spend a million, so they will have to sell for 700,000, then 400,000, until the price will stabilize at a certain level. Otherwise we will keep on having what I think everyone is experiencing: waiting lists everywhere, allocations, and distributions. This is not the way to resolve the economic problems of this country. Actually, at the stage of reform at which we are now, if we don't restore a balance between demand and supply as quickly as possible, the situation will become downright dangerous. The Bulgarians did so, as you know, at least for foodstuffs, and they did it in a radical manner. We should also do it as soon as possible.

[Iliescu] Does the low cost of Romanian labor stimulate investments in modernizing technologies?

[Stolojan] The labor force has its own price, as you mentioned, which should also be correlated with the other prices in the economy and a balance must be restored in this area, too. So what is our current situation? We are in a situation in which there is pressure to raise salaries, something that is not conducive to raising labor productivity. So clearly, when it comes to raising salaries—you were talking about the low cost of labor—of course it is lower compared to labor abroad, so from that viewpoint Romania has an advantage.

In relation to raw materials, the ratio of labor cost to product price is very low; the prices are relative, they are in a relationship of correlation, so this low labor cost varies from one branch to the next. For example, in education the labor cost swallows most of the expenses, and similarly high labor costs exist in many branches of the economy, but raising the cost of labor independently of labor productivity leads to inflationary price pressure and to all sorts of problems. We have to restore the balance.

[Iliescu] What guarantee do we have that the foreign loans we received will be utilized in areas that will permit us to pay them back quickly? Who will be responsible for possible mistakes in this respect?

[Stolojan] According to the laws in effect foreign loans are no longer the competency of the Finance Ministry. So it is no longer competent to take out financial credit. This competency rests with the National Bank, which is in charge of the monetary credit policy, including international credit. A ministry of economy and finance may be established in the future and may incorporate the currently existing planning agency. The finance minister is still in charge of relations with the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] and there are a few loans and credits that we handle directly in our relations with those institutions, for example a loan for the health care sector, an emergency loan for technical assistance, for agriculture, spare parts, transportation, and other areas that we still take care of. In connection with the loans we will take out from the World Bank for the health care sector, clearly that is a consumer loan. So far, our balance of payments situation is very tense and we have to meet payment obligations incurred especially in 1990.

[Iliescu] Will the EBRD play a major or minor role in the recovery of the Romanian economy?

[Stolojan] We have clearly requested the EBRD management to give us immediate help in agriculture. Why? Because we are currently implementing one of the largest-scale agricultural privatizations in all the East European countries, so it is an area that meets all the priority and opportuneness criteria of the European Bank. So we're waiting for their arrival to put things in motion. Of course, at the moment the bank's credit possibilities are limited, but they will increase in time, however, the problem arises in the other direction, too, namely can we show this bank an appropriate investment program? Let's take the case of agriculture! Who currently knows exactly what is happening in our counties? All we know is that thousands, hundreds of thousands of owners will emerge, or other kind of entities for whom private land ownership will become the essential issue. Who will represent the interests of these tens and hundreds of thousands of new economic entities in the agricultural sector? A policy is needed, but who is to conduct this policy? It could be conducted by a bank that has access to all the economic entities or by a ministry of agriculture, but the situation is not simple. That is why we requested the EBRD and its president to open an office here in Bucharest as soon as possible to help us organize in this area.

**END OF**

**FICHE**

**DATE FILMED**

21 June 1991